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Outlook 
and  
appraisal 
Overview 
 
 
 
Scotland and the UK are lagging behind as 
the rest of Europe, Japan and the United 
States start to recover from recession. The 
UK remained in recession in the third 
quarter and it seems likely that will be the 
outcome for Scotland too. Consumer 
spending remains weak, which is in part a 
consequence of the internationally high 
levels of debt held by UK households before 
the recession and the impact of falling asset 
prices and lending restrictions. But in the UK 
there are a wide range of indicators that can 
be cited, which suggest that a recovery is 
now underway. There is a widespread 
expectation that the UK economy will come 
out of recession in the fourth quarter of this 
year exhibiting a small but positive growth 
rate. The situation in Scotland is more 
difficult to call.   
 
The Scottish economy has contracted by 
slightly more than the UK over a shorter 
period. The evidence appears to suggest 
that the greater fall in Scottish GDP during 
the recession has been down to weaker 
service sector performance, principally 
financial services and real estate and 
business services. Recent surveys reveal 
rising expectations and an emerging 
recovery in Scottish manufacturing, but little 
sign in other sectors surveyed. Indications of 
recovery are weaker here than in many 
other UK regions. We therefore expect 
Scotland to emerge from recession in the 
fourth quarter, with likely growth around 
+0.2%, but less strongly than the rest of UK. 
And there remains a lower probability that 
the recession will not end in Scotland in the 
fourth quarter even though it does so in the 
UK economy as a whole. 
 
It would be a mistake to conclude that the 
economy’s troubles are over once growth 
resumes and the recession ends. The 
Scottish economy is likely currently to be at 
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least 8% below where its GDP would have 
been in the absence of recession. As long 
as this output gap persists there will be a 
deflationary dynamic in the economy as 
aggregate supply exceeds aggregate 
demand and unemployment is likely to 
continue to rise or remain high. Research by 
NIESR in London reveals that in previous 
UK recessions recovery to pre-recession 
output has never taken less than 40 months, 
or three and one-third years, and in the 
1930s depression and the 1980s recession 
recovery took around 50 months or just over 
4 years. Secondly, with the exception of the 
1990-93 recession all of the previous 
recessions exhibited “double-dip” behaviour 
to varying degrees, with the second 
downturn occurring 18, 28 and 30 months 
after the initial pre-recession peak. While 
recovery in growth is emerging it will clearly 
be some time before pre-recession output, 
employment and unemployment levels are 
restored. 
 
Domestic Scottish and UK consumer and 
investment demand may remain weak for 
some time as both households and firms 
seek to strengthen their balance sheets. The 
availability of sufficient bank credit to fully 
finance the recovery remains a source of 
continuing concern. The significant fiscal 
consolidation that is in prospect as the UK 
government seeks to reduce its deficit and 
stabilise, possibly reducing its debt position 
will serve to reduce domestic demand and 
spending. There are clear concerns that the 
fiscal consolidation might occur too soon 
before the necessary switching to export-
based growth can be achieved. In addition, 
concerns have been raised that the volume 
of money pumped into the world economy 
through quantitative easing, historically low, 
almost zero, interest rates and a declining 
US dollar, are fuelling a bubble in (risky) 
asset values. The concern is that the bubble 
will burst affecting real incomes and 
spending when monetary policy is tightened 
again and when the value of dollar 
stabilises. This also raises the issue whether 
monetary authorities should be targeting 
asset price bubbles directly. For all these 
reasons the prospect of a double-dip 
recession is therefore present. 
 
We take the view that the Scottish recovery 
may be weaker than in the UK for several 
reasons. The bias in the structure of the 
Scottish economy towards the public sector 
– 22% of GVA against 18% in the UK – 
means that the base for expansion is 
smaller here. The anticipated fiscal 
consolidation could be greater and/or have a 
greater impact on activity in Scotland. More 
technically, purchasing linkages between 
activities in Scotland – and hence multipliers 
- tend to be lower than in the UK because 
the Scottish economy is smaller and more 
open. Direct increases in demand tend to 
‘leak out’ more than at the UK level. This 
may be offset, though, if the Scottish 
economy enjoys a stronger export boost 
through its greater openness. But the 
increased exporting necessary to the 
recovery puts a premium on the 
performance of manufacturing. We remain 
concerned that Scottish manufacturing has 
the size, diversity and capability to take full 
advantage of a lower exchange rate and the 
recovery of global demand. If Scottish 
households seek to recover their net asset 
position by more than their UK counterparts 
then recovery will, other things equal, be 
weaker here. Finally, if the two main 
Scottish banks, key beneficiaries of tax-
payer funded support, are less willing to 
lend because of the need to rebuild their 
balance sheets to stabilise and raise their 
share price, then the Scottish economy may 
recover more slowly for this reason. 
 
Against this background our central forecast 
is for a decline in GDP/GVA of -5% this 
year. Compared with the Treasury’s average 
of new forecasts for the UK, we are now 
forecasting that the Scottish economy will 
perform less strongly than the UK in 2009 
on all three scenarios. Our forecasts for 
2010, 2011 and 2012 represent an 
improvement on our June position reflecting 
the evidence of stronger global recovery, 
allbeit with the UK lagging.  By 2011, 
household spending will be rising again and 
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will strengthen further in 2012, as do exports 
with investment also increasing from 2011. 
But we are forecasting large annual 
reductions in government spending from 
2011. For these reasons growth rises to 
1.1% and 1.6% in 2011 and 2012 but 
remains below trend. It is also worth noting 
that in 2010 in our central scenario we are 
allowing for one quarter of negative growth 
reflecting the headwinds buffeting the 
economy that we noted above. In the low 
growth scenario these headwinds are 
sufficient to produce two quarters of 
negative growth in the second half of 2010: 
a “double-dip” recession. 
 
On jobs, employment continues to fall 
through this year and next by more than 
160,000. Net jobs growth will return in 2011 
strengthening in 2012 but net job creation 
over these two years of nearly 52,000 
indicates a slower recovery, with a net loss 
of 108,000 jobs over the period.  
Nevertheless recovery is stronger than our 
forecast in June. Net job losses over the 
2009-12 period mainly occur in the service 
sector and in financial services in particular. 
 
On unemployment, we have made further 
upward revisions to our forecasts reflecting 
the lower GVA forecasts for 2009 and the 
evidence of fairly rapid falls in employment 
and rising employment in the first quarter of 
2009. Our central forecast is for ILO 
unemployment to rise from 200,082 (7.6%) 
in 2009, to 234,105 (9.2%) in 2010, but then 
to fall to 212,661 (8.7%) in 2011 and 
172,815 (7.7%) in 2012. 
 
 
Recent GDP performance 
The most recent official government GDP data for the 
Scottish economy were published on 21 October and refer 
to the second quarter of 2009. After the almost 
unprecedented contraction of -2.5% in the first quarter in 
both Scotland and the UK, Scottish gross value added at 
real basic prices fell by a further -0.8% between April and 
June compared to a smaller contraction of -0.6% in the UK 
– see Figure 1. 
 
Scotland’s GDP has therefore contracted by 6% over the 
four quarters since the recession began in second quarter 
of 2008. This is a slightly greater loss of net output than the 
drop in the UK as a whole, which amounted to 5.8% over 
the five quarters from the start of recession in the first 
quarter of 2008. The decline in GDP in Scotland has 
largely mirrored the decline in the UK as Figure 1 shows 
but nonetheless, on the data so far, the recession in output 
has been more severe here. 
 
Despite the larger drop in second quarter output in 
Scotland compared to the UK, the service sector – 
accounting for 74% of overall GVA – did better here. 
Service sector GVA fell by -0.4% in Scotland while UK 
services contracted by -0.6% – see Figure 2. But the other 
broad sectors manufacturing (14% of GVA), construction 
(7% of GVA) and electricity, gas & water (3% of GVA) 
performed worse in Scotland during the second quarter. 
Manufacturing GVA fell by -0.3% in Scotland against a fall 
of -0.1% in manufacturing in the UK – see Figure 3. The 
construction industry in Scotland has continued to 
experience further marked contractions with GVA falling by 
-2.8% in the second quarter compared to a fall of -0.8% in 
the industry in the UK – see Figure 4. Finally, output in 
electricity, gas & water fell by -11% during the quarter 
compared to a fall of -3.6% in the UK. 
 
Over the course of the recession service sector GVA in 
Scotland has fallen by -4.45% while the contraction in UK 
services amounts to -4.25%. Manufacturing GVA has fallen 
by -12.37% during the recession, which interestingly is 
slightly less than the fall of -13.81% in UK manufacturing. 
Dating the start of the recession in construction as 2008q2 
in Scotland and 2008q1 in the UK, output in the industry 
has fallen by -13.24% and -13.73%, respectively. However, 
there is a good case for arguing that the recession, or 
structural downturn, in Scottish construction began after 
2006q3 with output falling continuously apart from 2008q1 
and 2008q2. This decline has not been mirrored in UK 
construction. The loss of output in Scottish construction 
over this longer period amounts to -15.73%. The data on 
manufacturing and construction in particular highlight the 
outcome of some of the key dimensions of the present 
recession: its roots in the bursting of a commercial property 
and housing bubble and the indirect world-wide 
consequences for trade significantly depressing 
manufacturing output due to the much greater importance 
of export activity in the sector. 
 
 
Within services, the main sectoral drivers of contraction in 
the second quarter were hotels & catering (3% of overall 
GVA), transport & communication (7% of GVA), financial 
services (8% of GVA) and retail & wholesale (11% of GVA). 
Activity in hotels & catering fell by -3.3%, compared to a 
contraction of -1.2% in the sector in the UK. This provides 
one, all be it partial, indicator that tourism to Scotland has 
not benefited by much so far from the declining value of the 
pound sterling and by the “Homecoming Scotland” events. 
GVA in transport & communication services fell by -1.4%, a 
little better than the -1.8% contraction experienced in the
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Figure 1: Scottish and UK Quarterly GDP Growth, 1998q2 to 2009q2  
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Figure 2: Scottish and UK Services GVA Growth at constant basic prices 1998q2 to 2009q2 
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Figure 3: Scottish and UK Manufacturing GVA Growth at constant basic prices 1998q2 to 2009q2 
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Figure 4:  Scottish and UK Construction GVA Volume Growth 1998q2 - 2009q2 
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UK. Retail & wholesale GVA contracted by -0.4%, a little 
more than the -0.3% fall in the sector in the UK. But 
financial services contracted by 1% in Scotland compared 
to a rise of 0.2% in the sector in the UK – see Figure 5. 
 
The main reason for the outturn in services being more 
favourable in Scotland than in the UK is largely explained 
by the stronger performance in Scotland during the quarter 
of real estate & business services (REBS) and public 
administration, education and health. These two sectors 
together account for 40% of Scottish GVA with REBS 
contributing 18% and the public sector 22%. REBS grew by 
0.2% in the second quarter whereas its UK counterpart 
contracted by -1%. It is difficult to explain why this 
heterogeneous sector should have grown more strongly in 
Scotland during the quarter. However, approximately one 
half of the sector is property related and so the recent 
pickup in housing market transactions might have been 
reflected in greater activity amongst Scotland’s estate 
agents. 
 
Within manufacturing there were some interesting 
variations in sectoral performance both absolutely and 
relative to the UK in the second quarter. The weaker 
overall performance of Scottish manufacturing (-0.3%) 
compared to UK manufacturing (-0.1%) in the quarter was 
largely down to weakness in 4 sectors. Other 
manufacturing (3% of overall GVA), which includes paper, 
printing & publishing, contracted by -0.2% compared to 
growth of 1.2% in the sector in the UK. The chemicals 
industry continued to suffer badly in Scotland with a drop in 
output of -4.2% compared to an increase of 0.9% in the 
UK. The chemicals industry in Scotland has now lost a 
quarter (-25.1%) of its GVA over the three quarters since 
2008q3. The metals sector (1% of GVA) also experienced 
a significant cutback in the second quarter with output 
falling by –8.5% in Scotland compared to a fall of -3.2% in 
the UK. Finally, transport equipment (1% of GVA) saw a fall 
in production of -5.3% in Scotland compared to growth of 
4% in the UK.  
 
 
But while manufacturing performance was generally weak 
in the second quarter and weaker than UK manufacturing, 
there were perhaps unexpected exceptions. We noted the 
weakness in transport equipment but other parts of 
engineering, and engineering as a whole, performed well. 
Electronics (3% of GVA), which has lost more than 16% of 
its output in Scotland during the current recession exhibited 
positive growth of 5.8% compared to a fall in GVA of -0.9% 
in the sector in the UK. In addition, mechanical engineering 
(1% of GVA) also recorded positive growth of 0.1% while 
its UK counterpart contracted by -3.1%. Overall, Scottish 
engineering grew by 1.6% in the quarter compared to 0.1% 
in the sector in the UK. One other manufacturing sector, 
food & drink, performed strongly in the quarter displaying 
growth of 2.3% compared to 0.1% growth in the sector in 
UK. Most of this growth occurred in the food sector. 
 
An end to Scotland’s recession? 
 
Background 
Figures 6 and 7 chart the performance of key sectors in 
Scotland both before and during the recession. Figure 6 
indicates that all key growth sectors have been affected by 
the recession with the exception of the public sector.  
 
Figure 7 reveals the percentage decline by sector during 
the recession from the peak reached before the downturn. 
In sectors such as construction and financial services 
where there have been some fluctuations in GVA during 
the decline we have made a judgement as to the start of 
the recession in the sector. The latest data allow us to 
reaffirm some of our earlier conclusions about the course 
of the recession in Scotland and make a judgement on 
when we expect the recession to end. 
 
First, the recession began in construction, spread to 
financial services, then to manufacturing, with electronics 
and other manufacturing initially affected. Other service 
sectors such as REBS, other services and transport & 
communication then started to turn down. Latterly, sharp 
falls in GVA in other manufacturing sectors such as 
Chemicals and mechanical engineering occurred.  
 
Secondly, against a background of a fall in Scottish GDP of 
6% during the recession to date it is evident that some 
sectors have suffered disproportionately. One must be 
careful of a direct numerical comparison with the aggregate 
Scottish performance because the downturn began earlier 
or later in several sectors. Nevertheless, two sectors, 
chemicals and other manufacturing have lost more than 
20% of their GVA, 25% and 21% respectively. And the loss 
of output in chemicals has occurred in just three quarters. 
Of the six sectors experiencing contractions between 10% 
and 20% in the recession, three are export-oriented, 
manufacturing sectors: electronics, transport equipment 
and mechanical engineering. The other three are strongly 
associated with the property/finance cause of the 
recession: construction, financial services and REBS. The 
sectors declining between 0% and 10% are mainly in the 
service sector: hotels & catering, retail & wholesale, other 
services, and transport & communication. The remaining 
sector is in manufacturing: food & drink. Overall, the global 
impact of the property bubble burst and credit crunch has 
been on international trade and hence principally on 
manufacturing. Clearly, indirect impacts from reduced 
manufacturing output and from lower domestic household 
expenditure will affect output in local services. 
 
Thirdly, we also note in Figure 7 that four sectors appear to 
have reached a trough in their activity in the first quarter of 
this year. So, in these sectors the recession may already 
be over: electronics, REBS, food & drink, and mechanical 
engineering. Yet, the probability that the Scottish economy 
as a whole will have moved out of recession in the third 
quarter is low. We shall not have outturn data for third 
quarter Scottish GDP until January 2010, and so for the
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Figure 5: Scottish and UK Financial Services GVA Growth at constant basic prices 1998q2 to 2009q2 
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Figure 6: Growth of key sectors in Scotland 1998q2 to 2009q2 
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Figure 7:  GVA percentage decline to 2009q2, or to trough, from latest peak, by sector 
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Figure 8: Weighted Sectoral contribution to GVA decline in recession to 2009q2 in Scotland and UK 
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moment we must make a prediction drawing on a range of 
indicators. 
 
Likely third and fourth quarter outcomes 
GDP in the OECD area stabilised in the second quarter of 
the year and major countries such as France, Germany 
and Japan returned to positive growth, although not Italy 
and the United States. However, UK GDP contracted by -
0.6% in the second quarter, and then contracted further, by 
-0.4%, during July to September. In contrast, the United 
States returned to positive growth in the third quarter. 
There was much shock in the City when the UK third 
quarter figures were published because there was a 
widespread expectation that the UK either would come out 
of recession, or stabilise with close to zero growth. While 
the size of the continuing downturn was surprising, a fall in 
GDP was not unexpected. Indeed, the OECD in September 
had suggested an annualised fall in GDP in the UK in the 
third quarter of around -1%. There remains the strong 
possibility that the third quarter UK figure may be revised 
upwards as with the second quarter data, which were 
revised from -0.8% to    -0.6%. This would move the 
outturn data more into line with the survey data for the 
period. However, it seems unlikely that the revision would 
be sufficient to bring the UK out of recession in the third 
quarter suggesting that the UK economy is clearly lagging 
other major economies. The latest data reveal that the 16-
country eurozone grew by 0.4% in the third quarter, the 27 
country EU grew by 0.2% in the quarter and the lead EU 
economy, Germany, grew by 0.7%. From a UK standpoint 
both external and domestic demand are rising and 
domestic demand is likely to receive a boost right across 
the UK in the current quarter as household spending rises 
temporarily in anticipation of the reinstatement of the VAT 
reduction at the end of the year. So, there is a strong 
expectation that it will be the fourth quarter when the UK 
economy is seen to emerge from recession. 
 
The survey evidence for Scotland (See Review of 
Scottish Business Surveys in this Commentary) reveals 
rising confidence and improvements in orders and sales 
growth. Manufacturing activity appears to have 
strengthened considerably ahead of expectations in the 
third quarter in almost all of the surveys. The Scottish 
Chambers’ Business Survey (SCBS) revealed a positive 
balance on total new orders for the first time since the first 
quarter of 2008. The small positive balance on expected 
new orders reported in the second quarter strengthened 
further in the third quarter. Capacity utilisation was rising, 
although the net balance on investment intentions 
continued to be negative all be it at a lower rate and 
employment trends continued to be negative. In the SCBS 
for the third quarter, tourism trends were better than 
expected with a positive net balance on total visitor 
demand for the first time since the fourth quarter 2007. 
However, the trends in construction and retail & 
wholesaling were less buoyant. Negative net balances on 
orders or sales suggest that demand was continuing to fall. 
In retail and wholesale the declining negative net balance 
suggests that the decline in demand was slowing in the 
third quarter. But in construction a larger negative net 
balance on total new contracts and new orders suggests 
little slowing in the rate of decline.  
 
So, the partial survey data from the production side would 
appear to imply that it is unlikely that the overall Scottish 
economy will have experienced positive growth in the third 
quarter. There is evidence of a clear improvement 
compared with the second quarter but our judgement 
would be that the outturn for GVA growth in the third 
quarter will closely parallel the UK outturn of -0.4%. On the 
balance of probabilities, a high growth scenario would be 
likely to see zero growth in the third quarter, or a bottoming 
out, while a low growth expectation would see continued 
negative growth of perhaps -0.6%, a little better than the 
second quarter outturn. 
 
There is a widespread expectation that the UK economy 
will come out of recession in the fourth quarter of this year 
exhibiting a small but positive growth rate. We agree with 
this view since there are a wide range of indicators that can 
be cited on both the demand and supply sides, which 
suggest that a recovery is underway. However, the 
situation in Scotland is more difficult to call.  The SCBS in 
October saw clear signs of rising expectations and an 
emerging recovery in manufacturing, but little sign in the 
other sectors surveyed. Some surveys that include a rest of 
UK comparison, such as the Markit Regional PMI for 
September reveal that the indications of recovery are 
weaker here than in many other UK regions. In contrast, 
the CBI Industrial Trends survey in October suggested that 
Scottish manufacturing had been more buoyant than its UK 
counterpart over the preceding three months, with stronger 
growth in orders and output predicted for the fourth quarter. 
Against this background we take the view that there is a 
good chance that Scotland will emerge from recession in 
the fourth quarter, with likely growth around +0.2%, but less 
strongly than the rest of UK. But there also remains a lower 
probability that the recession will not end in Scotland in the 
fourth quarter even though it does so in the UK economy 
as a whole. 
 
Scotland versus UK performance 
We noted in earlier Commentaries that the Scottish 
economy tends to experience a shallower contraction 
during recession than the UK as a whole. In the November 
2008 Commentary we observed that the reasons for this 
are complex, reflecting the different structure of the 
Scottish economy, the behaviour of key actors in the 
economy and the source of the recession. Other things 
equal, a somewhat bigger public sector in Scotland and 
fairly high levels of income compensating social security 
payments have helped the economy weather downturns in 
private sector market demand for goods and services. In 
addition, the higher Scottish household propensity to save 
has tended to relatively protect Scottish household 
expenditure from interest rate hikes as it did in 1991. 
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Moreover, the lower degree of home ownership, lesser 
willingness to take 
 on debt also helped Scotland to avoid recession in that 
year. 
 
But the evidence to date in the present recession is that 
GVA has contracted by slightly more than the UK even 
though the Scottish economy was a quarter later into 
recession. The phrase “slightly more” should be stressed 
because the gap is unlikely to be statistically significant and 
so commentators such as ourselves should not make too 
much of it. We also note that the Scottish GVA data are 
recognised by the Office of the Chief Economic Adviser as 
“generally … less reliable than the equivalent estimates for 
the UK, primarily because the UK figures are produced by 
balancing three independent sets of estimates.” i The 
possibility of revisions is therefore great. In addition, 
Colleagues at the Centre for Public Policy for Regions have 
noted some difficulties and possible errors in the Scottish 
GVA estimatesii. But accepting the Scottish GVA statistics 
as published, what is different about the present 
recession? 
 
In November 2008 we raised the possibility that Scotland 
might do worse than the UK in the recession that was then 
in prospect. This was principally because we took the view 
that the impact on banking and financial services would be 
bigger here than in the UK due to the scale of the losses on 
sub-prime and impairments facing the two principal 
Scottish banks, RBS and HBOS, compared to other UK 
banks. This prediction has, so far, proved to be correct, 
with GVA of financial services in Scotland contracting by -
5.7% between the fourth quarter of last year and the 
second quarter of 2009, while GVA in UK financial services 
only fell by -1.9% over the same period. Moreover, financial 
services in Scotland was contracting some time before the 
fourth quarter of last year – see Figure 7– which was not 
the case in the UK. Whether this can be attributed to the 
recession or a structural adjustment in the industry 
disfavouring Scotland is a moot point. In addition, further 
contraction in Scottish banking is set to come although it 
may affect employment more than output if efficiency 
savings are secured through restructuring. It should be also 
noted that financial services are slightly more important in 
Scotland, 8% of GVA, than in the UK, 7% of GVA, hence 
the significance to the Scottish economy of a given 
percentage change in financial services GVA is marginally 
greater. The application of those weights to the respective 
reductions in GVA in financial services in Scotland and the 
UK, for the period of the downturn in overall Scottish and 
UK GDP suggests that aggregate Scottish GVA/GDP 
would have fallen by 0.7% more than UK GDP – see 
Figure 8. Other things equal that is more than sufficient to 
account for the gap in favour of UK GDP.  
 
However, other things were not equal as Figure 8 reveals. 
Production and construction GVA contracted by more in 
the UK than in Scotland during the recession, which would 
have served to reduce the gap by 0.26% and so reinforce 
the point that greater decline in financial services here is 
sufficient to explain the marginally greater loss of output in 
Scotland during the recession. But against that must be set 
the weaker performance of REBS in Scotland during the 
recession, which served to worsen the gap in Scottish GDP 
relative to the UK by 0.11%. 
 
So, overall, there is a strong case to make that the 
marginally greater fall in Scottish GDP during the recession 
has been down to weaker service sector performance, 
principally financial services and real estate and business 
services (REBS) to a lesser extent.  
 
There may be additional and complementary reasons why 
the overall contraction in GVA has been greater in 
Scotland, which can be offered as hypotheses: 
 
a) Scottish banks may be lending less to Scottish 
based firms than other banks. 
 
b) Scottish households may have cut back spending 
more than their rest of UK counterparts. 
 
There is little evidence to support any of these as far as 
their effect on the scale of the downturn relative to the UK. 
 
On a) while there is some anecdotal evidence that it has 
been easier to get loans and better financial terms from the 
banks in Scotland that have not been heavily supported by 
the state following the ‘credit crunch’, there is no indication 
from the GVA data to the second quarter that the reduction 
in the level of GVA in Scotland has been systematically 
greater across sectors than in the UK. The more rapid rate 
of decrease in Scottish GVA, which has affected many 
sectors, may, though, be partly a consequence of greater 
restriction on overdrafts, provision of working capital, and 
tighter terms on new credit. Across the UK there has clearly 
been a fall in bank lending, in part because of a flight of 
lending from foreign banks but also as UK banks have 
sought to restructure their balance sheets following the 
impairments and losses incurred in the ‘credit crunch’. But 
what cannot be established is whether in both Scotland 
and the UK the lower level of lending is simply, as the 
banks contend, a consequence of the recession, or 
whether it is a principal cause. These competing views will 
be put to the test as demand in the economy recovers. 
 
On b) given that Scottish households have a historic 
tendency to save proportionally more of their income than 
their UK counterparts, there is the fear that the cutback in 
Scottish household spending would be more severe in the 
present recession. This reflects the view that Scots 
households would make a more prudential response to 
scaling down debt levels in response to tightening credit 
availability and falling asset prices. However, the 
comparative buoyancy of retail and wholesale in Scotland 
during the recession to 2009q2 – see Figure 8 – suggests 
that this affect has not been present so far. However, 
business surveys such as the SCBS highlight the 
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weakness in orders and sales to the domestic Scottish 
market compared to rest of UK and abroad, although this 
may reflect a weakness in demand from other producers in 
Scotland rather than Scottish households. Furthermore, the 
hypothesised greater tendency of Scottish households to 
limit spending may be more relevant to the recovery than 
the downturn. In this connection, the finding in the Markit 
Regional PMI in September that the rate of improvement 
was slower in Scotland than in other UK regions could be 
salient. 
 
The dynamics of recovery 
It would be a mistake to conclude that economy’s troubles 
are over once growth resumes and the recession ends. We 
have seen that both Scottish and UK economies have lost 
around 6% of GDP since the recession began and for 
Scotland at least a little more output may be lost before the 
recession ends. A key issue, then, is how quickly will the 
economy get back to pre-recession levels of output. A 
further issue is when the economy will get back to where it 
would have been in the absence of recession. Here we 
need to take into account trend growth prior to the start of 
recession. So, a 2% per annum trend growth means that a 
further 2% of GDP will have been foregone for each year of 
the recession and subsequent below trend growth in the 
recovery. Assuming that the recession has not lowered 
trend growth – which is a possibility - then to the latest data 
point, 2009q2, the Scottish economy is likely to have been 
8% below where its GDP would have been in the absence 
of recession. As long as this output gap persists there will 
be a deflationary dynamic in the economy as aggregate 
supply exceeds aggregate demand and unemployment is 
likely to continue to rise or remain high. 
 
Recent work by the National Institute for Social and 
Economic Research in London charts the percentage fall in 
UK GDP from the pre-recession peak until output fully 
recovered in the Depression of 1930-34 and the recessions 
of 1973-76, 1989-83, 1990-93 and the current recession. 
The data are graphed in Figure 9. 
 
The chart reveals two key issues that are worthy of 
consideration: the length of time taken to fully recover and 
the frequency of setbacks in the recovery, especially a 
“double-dip”. First, recovery to pre-recession output has 
never taken less than 40 months, or three and one-third 
years, and in the 1930s depression and 1980s recession 
recovery took around 50 months or just over 4 years. 
Secondly, with the exception of the 1990-93 recession all 
of the previous recessions exhibited “double-dip” behaviour 
to varying degrees, with the second downturn occurring 18, 
28 and 30 months after the initial pre-recession peak. 
 
The key question is whether this historical evidence has 
any relevance to recovery from the present recession both 
in the UK and Scotland, for which we do not have 
comparable data to conduct a similar exercise to that 
undertaken by NIESR for the UK.  
 
The Governor of the Bank of England in his Inflation Report 
press conference on 11 November 2009 draws conclusions 
about the present recession that reflect the historical 
experience charted by NIESR. It is worth quoting some of 
his words: 
 
“…small movements in quarterly growth rates will not alter 
the extent of the challenges now facing the economy, such 
is the scale of the fall in output over the past eighteen 
months. The UK economy is facing a prolonged period of 
balance sheet adjustment. That will not be achieved in a 
few quarters. …. Despite a recovery in economic growth, 
output is unlikely, at least for a considerable period, to 
return to a level consistent with a continuation of its pre-
crisis trend.”iii 
 
Growth is returning right across the world economy, even 
though world trade and economic activity remain below 
pre-recession levels. Indeed, while recovery in the UK and 
Scotland may be lagging, global indicators of recovery are 
ahead of expectations in much the same way as the scale 
and rapidity of output decline confounded earlier 
expectations. The significant monetary and fiscal stimuli is 
clearly having a positive effect on demand in many 
countries, even though there are concerns, especially in 
Britain, that the impact of quantitative easing may be muted 
by sub-optimal bank lending. The openness of the Scottish 
economy to trade and investment flows should ensure that 
the benefits accrue to Scotland even if domestic 
investment and consumer demand continues to remain 
weak. A near 25% fall in the value of sterling makes the 
Scottish and rest of UK economies well placed to take 
advantage of the upturn in global demand. Yet, as the 
Bank’s recent Inflation Report notes: “… there are a 
number of headwinds that are likely to impede the 
recovery.” 
 
Domestic Scottish and UK consumer and investment 
demand may remain weak for some time as both 
households and firms seek to strengthen their balance 
sheets. The availability of sufficient bank credit to fully 
finance the recovery remains a source of continuing 
concern. The significant fiscal consolidation that is in 
prospect as the UK government seeks to reduce its deficit 
and stabilise, possibly reducing its debt position will serve 
to reduce domestic demand and spending. There are clear 
concerns that the fiscal consolidation might occur too soon 
before the necessary switching to export-based growth can 
be achieved. In addition, concerns have been raised that 
the volume of money pumped into the world economy 
through quantitative easing, historically low, almost zero, 
interest rates and a declining US dollar, are fuelling a 
bubble in (risky) asset values. The concern is that the 
bubble will burst affecting real incomes and spending when 
monetary policy is tightened again and when the value of 
dollar stabilisesiv This also raises the issue whether 
monetary authorities should be targeting asset price 
bubbles directly. For all these reasons the prospect of a 
double-dip recession is therefore present.
FRASER ECONOMIC COMMENTARY 
NOVEMBER 2009 PAGE 15 
Figure 9:  The Profile of the Depression: Months from the Start of the Depression and UK Recessions 
  
Source: National Institute for Economic and Social Research 5 November 2009  
http://www.niesr.ac.uk/pdf/051109_144552.pdf 
 
 
We take the view that the Scottish recovery may be weaker 
than in the UK for the following reasons: 
 
x The bias in the structure of the Scottish economy 
towards the public sector – 22% of GVA against 
18% in the UK – means that the base for 
expansion is smaller here. 
x The anticipated fiscal consolidation could be 
greater and/or have a greater impact on activity in 
Scotland. This depends on a number of unknowns 
such as: where the UK cuts fall in relation to 
reserved and non-reserved activities; the scale of 
the UK cuts, which in part depend on future GDP 
growth and interest rates; the nature of any tax 
increases; and the decisions of the Scottish 
Government. 
x More technically, purchasing linkages between 
activities in Scotland – and hence multipliers - 
tend to be lower than in the UK because the 
Scottish economy is smaller and more open. 
Direct increases in demand tend to ‘leak out’ more 
than at the UK level. This may be offset, though, if 
the Scottish economy enjoys a stronger export 
boost through its greater openness. 
 
x But we noted our concerns in the June 2009 
Commentary that the increased exporting 
necessary to the recovery puts a premium on the 
performance of manufacturing (68% of exports 
abroad from Scotland are manufactured goods). 
We remain concerned that Scottish manufacturing 
has the size, diversity and capability to take full 
advantage of a lower exchange rate and the 
recovery of global demand. 
x If Scottish households seek to recover their net 
asset position by more than their UK counterparts 
then recovery will, other things equal, be weaker 
here. 
x Finally, if the two main Scottish banks, key 
beneficiaries of tax-payer funded support, are less 
willing to lend because of the need to rebuild their 
balance sheets to stabilise and raise their share 
price, then the Scottish economy may recover 
more slowly for this reason.  
 
Forecasts 
Our latest forecasts for the Scottish economy have been 
prepared against the economic and policy background 
considered above and discussed in considerable detail 
along with the forecasts in the section on Forecasts of the 
Scottish Economy below. 
 
Given the continuing climate of uncertainty and the 
significant data revisions to both Scottish and First Release 
UK data, we adopt the practice of recent Fraser Economic 
Commentaries and present three alternative scenarios for 
growth, employment and unemployment in the Scottish 
economy: we label the scenario that we feel is most likely 
“central”, with “high growth” and “low growth” as two 
respectively upper and lower growth alternatives. The 
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GVA Forecasts 
 
Table 1: Forecast Scottish GVA Growth in Three Scenarios, 2009-2012 
 
 
GVA Growth (% per annum) 2009 2010 2011 2012 
     
High growth -4.9 1.6 1.8 2.1 
June forecast -1.9 -0.5 1.6 2.1 
Central -5.0 0.1 1.1 1.6 
June forecast -2.9 -0.9 0.6 1.4 
Low growth -5.2 -0.7 -0.1 0.5 
June forecast -3.8 -1.7 -0.2 0.4 
 
 
Table 2: Forecast Scottish Net Jobs Growth in Three Scenarios, 2009-2012 
 
 
Net job no’s 2009 2010 2011 2012 
     
High growth -126,915 -352 36,025 44,154 
June forecast -62,827 -23,152 33,584 45,174 
Central  -130,776 -29,615 20,292 31,467 
June forecast -84,399 -51,451 11,301 26,824 
Low growth -134,864 -46,593 -3,409 6,788 
June forecast -103,579 -66,894 -3,722 6,847 
 
 
Table 3: Forecast Scottish ILO and Claimant Count Unemployment in Three Scenarios, 2009-12 
 
 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 
ILO unemployment  
High growth % 7.2% 7.6% 6.5% 5.0% 
Central         % 7.6% 9.2% 8.7% 7.7% 
Numbers 200,082 234,105 212,661 172,815 
Low growth   % 8.2% 10.5% 11.0% 11.0% 
     
Claimant count  
High growth 4.5% 4.6% 3.7% 2.8% 
Central         % 4.9% 5.8% 5.2% 4.2% 
Numbers 136,821 160,087 145,423 118,175 
Low growth   % 5.3% 6.7% 6.8% 6.5% 
 
“central” scenario is that which is most likely, while the 
“high growth” and “low growth” scenarios reveal the range 
of possible outcomes for the Scottish economy foreseen for 
future developments from November 2009 through 2010 to 
2012 
 
The key GVA forecasts are summarised in Table 1 along 
with our June forecasts for comparison. We shall primarily 
focus on our central forecast here. It is clear that we have 
revised downwards considerably our GVA forecast for 
2009 to -5.0%. The narrow gap between the forecasts on 
the three scenarios for 2009 is mainly due to the fact that 
we already have two of the four quarters of outturn data. 
The predicted contraction of output in 2009 is appreciably 
lower than the June central forecast due to a significant 
reduction in household spending, weaker tourism 
expenditure and a larger reduction in investment demand. 
The growth of government spending is positive this year 
and export demand is recovering. In 2010, there is some 
recovery in Scottish household spending but it still remains 
below 2009 levels. Government spending continues to rise 
but at a reduced rate. Tourism demand begins to recover 
but aggregate investment remains low. In contrast, export 
demand to both the rest of the world and rest of UK picks 
up. GVA is forecast to be largely flat in 2010 with 0.1% 
growth projected. However, the discussion above and in 
the Forecasts of the Scottish Economy section below 
suggests that demand in the global economy is recovering 
more quickly than anticipated in June and so we are 
forecasting stronger growth in 2010. 
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 By 2011, household spending will be rising again and will 
strengthen further in 2012, as do exports with investment 
also increasing from 2011. But we are forecasting large 
annual reductions in government spending from 2011. For 
these reasons growth rises to 1.1% and 1.6% in 2011 and 
2012 but remains below trend. It is also worth noting that in 
2010 in our central scenario we are allowing for one 
quarter of negative growth reflecting the headwinds 
buffeting the economy that we noted above. In the low 
growth scenario these headwinds are sufficient to produce 
two quarters of negative growth at the in the second half of 
2010: a “double-dip” recession. 
 
Employment forecast 
The principal forecasts for net jobs growth are presented in 
Table 2. On our central scenario employment continues to 
fall through this year and next by more than 160,000. Net 
jobs growth will return in 2011 strengthening in 2012 but 
net job creation over these two years of nearly 52,000 
indicates a slower recovery, with a net loss of 108,000 jobs 
over the period.  Nevertheless recovery is stronger than 
our forecast in June. 
 
Even on the high growth scenario net jobs in Scotland in 
2012 are around 47,000 lower than in 2008. On the low 
growth scenario, the number is 177,000. At the sectoral 
level in the central scenario, the burden of jobs losses is 
born by the service sector, which might be expected given 
its relative size. In services, we expect some 95,000 net 
jobs to be lost during 2009 and 2010, with jobs growth 
returning thereafter. Of these lost jobs, around 26,000 are 
expected to occur in financial services. Manufacturing and 
construction job losses are projected to amount to nearly 
39,000 jobs and 23,000 jobs, respectively, with net job 
creation beginning again in both sectors in 2011. 
 
Unemployment forecast 
Table 3 presents our main forecasts for unemployment 
over the 2009 to 2012 time horizon. 
 
We have again revised upwards our forecasts for 
unemployment compared with the previous Commentary in 
June. This reflects the lower GVA forecasts for 2009 and 
the evidence of fairly rapid falls in employment and rising 
unemployment in the first quarter of 2009. Unemployment 
has been rising more rapidly in Scotland than in the UK, 
but this shouldn’t necessarily be taken as indicating that 
Scotland is doing worse in recession. A recession that 
affects different parts of the country equally would, other 
things equal, tend to raise the rate of unemployment more 
quickly in those regions with lower unemployment rates. 
The ILO unemployment rate in Scotland is currently 7.2% 
and remains below the UK rate of 7.9%. What happens to 
the future course of unemployment in Scotland depends 
not only on the loss of jobs but on the extent to which 
people who lose their jobs switch into inactivity, or migrate, 
rather than switch into unemployment.  
 
We have previously taken the view that the recession in 
jobs and unemployment may be weaker than the recession 
in output. This is because the Scottish and UK labour 
markets are more “flexible” than they were in the 1980s. 
Employers will seek to hold on to core workers and will do 
so if there is the prospect of introducing short-time working, 
cutting wages, salaries and bonus payments, and letting go 
of part-time and temporary workers. The Overview of the 
Labour Market section below notes that in the year to 
March 2009 the percentage declines in part-time and 
temporary workers were higher than the decline in full-time 
employees. However, the section notes that there are limits 
to flexibility and that these limits may be approaching. A 
quick recovery in GVA growth will make it easier for 
companies to hold on to staff but a more slow recovery will 
make that task more difficult. In addition, we are likely to 
see rising job losses in the public sector with the flow of 
announcements of actual and planned job reductions in 
local government currently rising and set to rise further in 
2010.  
 
 
____________________ 
 
Endnotes 
iGDP for scotland for the 2nd Quarter of 2009, Statistics 
publication Notice, Scottish Government, page 2. 
iiCentre for Public Policy for Regions  
http://www.cppr.ac.uk/centres/cppr/analysisofthescottisheconom/ 
iiiInflation Report Press Conference, Wednesday 11 November 
2009, Opening Remarks by the Governor.  
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/inflationreport/irspote
111109.pdf 
ivNouriel Roubini “Mother of all carry trades faces an inevitable 
bust”, Financial Times, 1 November 2009. 
 
 
Brian Ashcroft 
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The 
Scottish 
economy 
Forecasts of the 
Scottish economy 
 
 
 
Economic background  
It is five months since the last forecasts of the Scottish 
economy were published in the Fraser Economic 
Commentary. In that time, we have seen confirmation that 
Q2 growth was down 0.8% on Q1 2009, meaning that 
Scotland has now seen four quarters of consecutive 
negative growth. The rate of negative growth appears to 
have slowed, with Q1 2009 seeing a 2.5% quarterly 
reduction. Scottish GDP in Q2 was down 6.1% from its 
peak in Q2 2009.  
 
We noted in June’s forecast that growth prospects for 
Scotland would be significantly affected by the duration of 
the global downturn and the speed by which policy 
decisions feed through to restore confidence across the 
economic system. With continued low economic activity 
across Scotland and the UK, only in some figures for Q3 
2009 are we beginning to see some signs of economic 
recovery in some key markets for Scottish goods and 
services. As a result, since June most commentators have 
revised down their forecasts for growth in 2009, and we are 
no exception.  
 
Forecasts for growth in 2010 in Scotland’s major export 
markets remain broadly similar to those made earlier in this 
year, indicating a growing feeling that the worst of the 
downturn may be past. The most recent survey data on 
business confidence in Scotland, summarised elsewhere in 
this issue of the Fraser Economic Commentary, suggest 
that there are rising net balances in business confidence – 
not necessarily across all sectors of the Scottish economy 
– although there also concerns as to the pace at which the 
Scottish economy returns to growth. The Scottish 
Chambers’ Business Survey, for instance, reports that 
survey respondents in manufacturing, wholesale 
distribution and tourism were reporting rising confidence, 
while the declines in confidence seen earlier in 2009 in the 
important construction and retail sectors were lessening.  
 
While the speed of the return to growth in Scotland will be 
intimately tied to economic growth elsewhere, particularly 
in major trading partners, we remain uncertain as to the 
future pattern of growth in Scotland over the coming years. 
As with previous forecasts, we present three scenarios for 
growth for the three years from 2009. Our central scenario 
is the one which we feel is the most likely, but clearly 
apparent uncertainty in the macroeconomic environment, 
combined with often substantial revisions to GDP data 
between quarters, leads us to have a “high growth” and 
“low growth” alternative scenarios around this central 
scenario. In this article we report the new forecasts for 
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Scottish GDP growth as well as forecasts for the future for 
the Scottish labour market.  
 
Firstly, we examine some of the key economic policy 
developments since June’s forecasts, and likely 
developments over the coming months. 
 
The unprecedented monetary response of the UK 
authorities to the economic environment has continued. 
Interest rates were held at 0.5% by the MPC at their 
meeting in November, the eighth month this rate has 
remained unchanged. Interest rates have similarly been 
kept at historic low levels in the Eurozone and the US. In 
the UK, the Bank of England has extended its programme 
of “quantitative easing” (QE). In August, the Bank’s 
Monetary Policy Committee decided that the QE 
programme should be extended to £175 billion, and on the 
5th of November, the MPC voted to increase the size of the 
QE programme by a further £25 billion, up to £200 billion in 
total. Between March and the 6th of November, purchases 
of almost £174.9 billion have been made through this 
facility.  
 
An initial assessment of the impact of QE on the UK 
economy was made by Charles Bean (a member of the 
MPC) in October 2009 (Bean, 2009). He points to a 
number of data to show the impact of QE. Firstly, in his 
assessment, the spread on gilt yields (the difference 
between gilts and expected future Bank Rates) has 
reduced by around ¾ percentage points, while there have 
not been the same movements in the Eurozone, where no 
purchases of Government debt have occurred, or the US, 
where the Federal Reserves activities have purchased a 
smaller share of the government debt market. Secondly, 
corporate bond spreads have reduced, while equity prices 
have risen by almost half since March 2009. UK 
corporations have issued more than the annual average 
number of bonds with £60 billion issued, compared to an 
average of £40 billion. Bean notes that the aim of the policy 
is to get the annual rate of nominal spending back to 
around 5% or so, while over the last year nominal spending 
has fallen by almost 5%. His assessment concludes that 
“we will probably never know exactly how effective the 
policy of QE has been, for the simple reason that we can 
never know with precision what would have happened in its 
absence. My only confident prediction is that academic 
economists and their PhD students will be poring over the 
topic for decades to come” (Bean, 2009, p. 6). 
 
The Budget in April 2009 announced the extension of some 
of the packages introduced in November 2008’s Pre-
Budget Report (PBR), including the reduction in the rate of 
VAT. This commenced from 1st December 2008, when VAT 
was reduced to 15% from 17.5%. This was announced as 
a temporary programme, and will be removed from 1st of 
January 2010, when VAT will return to 17.5%. Capital 
expenditures have been brought forward at both UK and 
Scottish levels, with £3 billion brought forward in the UK 
2008 PBR. The Scottish Government’s budget for 2010-11, 
announced in September 2009, sought to balance the 
expected “squeeze” on public spending over the years from 
2011. Accelerated capital spending for 2010-11, include 
spending on the rail network across Scotland, the prisons 
system and school buildings. To preserve capital budgets 
in future years the Scottish Government announced its 
decision to cancel the proposed Glasgow Airport Rail Link 
(linking Glasgow Airport to Glasgow City Centre, through a 
new line between Paisley and the Airport). The proposed 
budget has now entered its committee stage, and will likely 
be debated early in 2010.  
 
In light of recent large increases in Government borrowing 
at UK level, and related pressures on government budgets 
over coming years, it is unlikely that UK and Scottish 
government expenditure from 2011 will drive economic 
activity and growth over the medium-term. It is likely that 
the next decade will see significant cuts in government 
spending at all levels, i.e. central and local government 
spending. For example, CPPR estimated an 8.5% 
reduction between 2009-10 budgets and the budget at the 
end of 2013-2014 (CPPR, 2009). Scotland’s growth 
prospects compared to the rest of the UK will to some 
extent depend upon not only the extent to which the private 
sector returns to positive growth, but the extent to which 
government spending is reduced. 
  
Key for future developments in the Scottish labour market 
will be the larger share of employment in public sector. 
Latest figures (James, 2009) show that public sector 
employment in Scotland in Q4 2008 was 23.0% of all in 
employment, while across the UK, 19.8% of total 
employment was in the public sector. The share of 
employment in the public sector in Scotland has remained 
relatively constant between Q4 1999 and the most recent 
data, while across the UK public sector employment was 
slightly higher than in Q4 1999 (19.2%). While these facts 
could insulate the Scottish labour market from the worst of 
the most recent downturn, the anticipated future changes in 
public expenditures may be expected to hit hardest those 
areas where, other things being equal, the public sector 
has a larger share of employment. 
 
Further complicating the position of forecasters in what are 
uncertain times, the Chief Economic Advisor notes in 
“State of the Economy” (August 2009), the large 
uncertainties in calculating GDP and GVA at the regional 
level have led to a number of significant revisions to the 
estimated figures. At the UK level, Q2 2008 growth was 
revised downwards in June 2009 meaning that quarterly 
GDP change turned negative in Q2 2008. We continue to 
present three scenarios for Scottish GVA changes, in part 
due to these significant alterations to GVA, and will 
continue to monitor our forecasts in light of any future 
revisions to GVA data for Scotland.  
 
The Scottish economy 
In the last quarter for which data are available (Q2 2009, 
published on 22nd April 2008), the Gross Domestic Product 
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in Scotland fell by 0.8% from the previous quarter (Q1 
2009), which had fallen by 2.5% compared to Q4 2008 as 
noted in the introduction above. Scotland officially entered 
recession after the second consecutive quarterly decline in 
GDP in Q4 2008 and has now seen four quarters of 
negative GDP growth. The decline in GDP in Q2 2009 is 
significantly less than the decline in Q1, and less than that 
seen in Q3 and Q4 2008, leading some commentators to 
suggest that the decline in the size of the GDP decreases 
is a sign that the worst of the economic downturn is over. 
 
In Q2 2009, the decline in the service sector continued, 
with an overall decline of 0.4%, after falling 1.6% in Q1 
2009. Some 74.2% of Scottish activity is in this broad 
industrial grouping, and these sectors had contributed most 
to the recent growth of the Scottish economy. Within the 
service sector, there were large quarterly falls in Hotels and 
Catering (-3.3%), Communications (-2.9%), Other services 
(-1.2%) and Financial services (-1.0%). Retail and 
wholesale’s contribution to Scottish GDP also declined in 
Q2, down 0.4%. These falls were partially, but not wholly 
offset by a strong performance in Public admin, education 
and health, which grew by 0.2% in Q2, helped in part by a 
1.0% growth in Health and Social Work. Gains were seen 
in Real estate and business services (0.2%), which showed 
its first quarter on quarter growth since Q1 2008. Financial 
services was down 1.0% in the quarter, continuing its 
decline from a high reached in Q1 2007, and down 7.0% 
over the last four quarters compared to the preceding four 
quarters.  
 
Production sectors, responsible for 17.7% of Scottish GDP, 
declined 1.9% in Q2 and continued the decline that began 
in Q3 2008. The decline in the most recent quarter was 
less than that of Q1 2009 (-5.6%) and Q4 2008 (-3.8%). 
Within the production sectors, large falls were seen in 
Electricity, gas and water supply (-11.0%), while the Mining 
and Quarrying sector displayed its first positive quarterly 
growth since Q2 2007. There was a decline in 
Manufacturing (-0.2%) driven by a combination of 
significant reductions in the contribution to GDP from 
Refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel (-9.1%), 
Metals and Metal products (-8.5%) and Chemicals and 
man-made fibres (-4.2%), and positive growth in Food and 
Tobacco (4.8%) and Electrical and Instrument Engineering 
(5.8%). The Construction sector reported a fourth 
subsequent quarter of declining value added, falling by 
2.8% in Q2, reduced from a fall of 5.8% in Q1. The broad-
based sectoral nature of this recession thus continues, with 
a few notable exceptions. 
 
Labour market developments in Scotland to the end of 
August 2009 showed falling employment and increasing 
unemployment from what had been historic highs and lows 
respectively. Employment of those aged over 16 between 
June and August stood at 2,497 thousand, down 41,000 (or 
1.6%) on the same period one year previously. The 
employment rate for those of working age was down from 
74.4% to 74.0% in one quarter, and down from 76.0% in 
the same quarter one year previously. The number of 
people over the age of 16 who were unemployed rose by 
67,000 over the last year, approximately twice the rise 
reported in the last commentary for the year to April 2009, 
and now stands at 194 thousand. The number of those 
receiving unemployment-related benefits stood at 132,600 
in September 2009. The claimant count figure is up 49,000 
since September 2008. 
 
 
Final demand and recent trends 
The FAI forecasting model acknowledges the drivers of 
economic activity in the Scottish economy to be 
consumption, government spending, investment, tourism 
and exports (to the rest of the UK and the rest of the 
World). For all three scenarios considered the recent 
trends in each of these measures, as well as recent survey 
evidence, are discussed below.  
 
 
 Consumption 
x Data being developed on Scottish Household final 
consumption expenditure, release in 28th October 
through the Scottish Government’s Scottish 
National Accounts Project (SNAP), show that Q2 
2009 saw the third consecutive decline in current 
price Scottish household expenditure, following on 
from the declines in Q4 2008 and Q1 2009. 
Nominal Scottish household spending was down 
0.21% in the quarter, and 3.4% lower than the 
same quarter one year before. The decline in Q1 
2009 was 2.34%, so there would appear to be 
evidence that the decline in household 
expenditure appears to be moderating. These 
data are not National Statistics, and so should be 
considered experimental, but do serve to give a 
potentially vital insight into trends in household 
spending – which is crucial for economic activity – 
at the Scottish level. 
 
x Figures from the Scottish Retail Consortium 
confirmed that like-for-like sales in September 
2009 were 1.5% higher than the same month one 
year earlier, and total sales were up 4.3%. These 
are nominal figures, so could indicate that 
households are protecting expenditures in the 
sectors covered by this survey, and making 
reductions in other areas. 
 
x On large-scale purchases, one of the most visible 
sectors recently has been the motor industry, 
which saw large reductions in out at the start of 
2009. Recent sales data from the Scottish Motor 
Trade Association (SMTA) reported that new car 
registrations in October 2009 were up 45% on 
new car registrations in October 2008. The SMTA 
explain this as being significantly aided by the UK 
Government’s car scrappage scheme which gives 
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car owners a £2,000 discount on a new car when 
they trade in a car more than ten years old which 
they have owned for over 12 months. Initially, 
£300 million was allocated to the scheme, which 
would run until February 2010 or until the funding 
is used up. In September, the UK Government 
extended the fund by £100 million, meaning that 
the fund would cover up to 400,000 vehicles.  
 
x One key issue will be the extent to which the VAT 
increase from January 2010 and the scrappage 
scheme, running out in February 2010, have been 
bringing car sales forward that would otherwise 
happen in that year. 
 
x The Halifax House Price Index reported (23rd 
October 2009) that Q3 2009 saw a 5.3% rise in 
house prices compared to Q2 2009, however 
prices are down 6.3% compared to the year 
previous. On their measure, average UK house 
prices have fallen 7.4% annually, meaning that 
Scottish house prices have been more resilient.  
 
 Government spending 
x Across the advanced economies, government 
spending has stepped in to provide a fiscal 
stimulus to economic activity in 2009 and 2010. 
The extent of these packages ranges from around 
2% of GDP in the UK to around 5.5% in the US, 
and includes a range of tax or spending initiatives. 
There is considerable uncertainty over the impact 
that the removal of these packages will have. 
 
x Further, but related to the above point, public 
finances across most developed countries are at 
levels which are typically seen as unsustainable 
over the long-run, requiring some reductions in 
spending over the coming years. The Institute of 
Fiscal Studies, for instance, have forecast 
average declines of 2.3% per year for the three 
years from 2011-12. Before that year however, 
which would be after the next Spending Review, 
public expenditures appear set to be reduced. In 
his May “State of the Economy” report, Scotland’s 
Chief Economic Advisor’s (May 2009) noted that 
spending controlled by the Scottish Government 
through the Departmental Expenditure Levels, 
which makes up the principal element of 
discretionary spending at the disposal of the 
Scottish Government, will grow by around 4.5% in 
2009-10, but decline by 1.7% in 2010-11. This will 
be, in part, due to the reallocation of capital 
spending from 2010-11 forward to 2009-10 as part 
of the Economic Recover Plan. 
 
 Investment 
x There are no figures available for investment in 
Scotland, but business investment figures are 
reported for the UK. UK figures for business 
investment in Q2 2009 were published in 
September. These reported that business 
investment fell 10.2% from Q1 2009, and was 
21.8% lower than Q2 in 2008, clearly illustrating 
the significant impacts on investment through the 
current economic downturn.  
 
x Total business investment in real terms across the 
UK was lower in Q2 2009 than in Q3 2006 across 
the majority of sectors where investment data is 
reported. 
 
x Scottish Engineering and Scottish Chambers both 
reported falling investments in Scotland, indicating 
some support for the link between investment at 
the Scottish and UK levels. Going forward, there 
appear to be low expectations of significant 
increases in investment over the short term, with 
only 16% expected to increase investments. 
 
 Tourism 
x Visit Scotland figures showed that in July and 
August hotels occupancy levels were higher than 
those in the same month in 2008, and while room 
occupancy in June was unchanged compared to 
June 2008, bed occupancy was higher, indicating 
that there was some signs that the forecasts of a 
good year for tourism were observed. The 
“staycations” forecast in June’s commentary – 
where overseas holidays were swapped in favour 
of domestic holidays by Scottish families during 
2009 – might be confirmed when later data 
becomes available, but there is some support for 
this from the limited evidence available so far.  
 
x An ongoing issue was the extent to which 
occupancy was sustained by discounting, and this 
will have implications for the contribution to GVA 
of the hotels and catering sector. 
 
x Q2 2009 (for the period April to June) figures for 
the hotels and catering sector revealed a drop of 
3.3%, but this is before any of the higher 
occupancy figures reported in the paragraph 
above. We would be interested in seeing how 
these higher occupancy figures translated into 
greater contributions to GVA in Q3, which will be 
available into the New Year. 
 
x It is likely that the Homecoming Scotland 
programme of events for during 2009 have 
protected some sectors in particular areas through 
the year, and partly been responsible for the 
increase in occupancy figures observed over the 
summer months. 
 
x Into the future, the nature of tourism offerings 
could be expected to be affected by the economic 
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downturn, although one would expect that this 
effect would not be homogenous across all 
categories of tourism. Niche tourism offerings, 
such as sport and adventure tourism, could 
continue to protect Scotland’s tourism offering 
compared to that of other regions, however, due 
to increased joblessness and possibility of 
unemployment it is likely that it will be well into 
2010 before tourism numbers and spending see 
increases.  
 
 Exports to the rest of the UK  
x While there is not separately identified evidence 
available on recent changes in exports from 
Scotland to the rest of the UK, this is the most 
important destination for Scottish goods after 
Scottish domestic consumption (which would 
include households, government (central and 
local), investment and tourism). The 2004 IO 
tables show that exports to the rest of the UK 
were worth more than double the value of exports 
to the rest of the world. This data is the most 
recent we are able to find comparing exports to 
the rest of the UK and exports to the rest of the 
World, but we would not expect that this ratio 
would have changed over years since it was 
published. Clearly, additional data would greatly 
help us to understand changes in demand in this 
important market for Scottish goods. 
 
x Forecasts for the UK, as alluded to in the 
introduction, have been revised down slightly 
since we forecast in June. The average of new 
(within the last three month) independent 
forecasts for the UK economy is -4.3% in 2009, 
with the same measure in 2010 forecast at 1.3%. 
There is considerable uncertainty over estimates 
for UK growth in 2010 apparent from the range of 
new independent forecasts between -0.5% and 
2.2%. 
 
x As noted elsewhere in this edition of the Fraser 
Economic Commentary, Scottish Chamber and 
CBI respondents reported trends in total rest of 
UK orders which were better than previous 
quarters Scottish Engineering survey respondents 
also reported an improvement in the trend in 
export demand. This could be consistent with a 
strengthening of the market for goods in the rest 
of the UK as we move into 2010.  
 
  Exports to the rest of the world  
x The most recent figures on total Scottish exports 
to the rest of the World reveal that in 2007 
Scotland exports totalled £20.6 billion, of which 
£13.6 billion came from exports of Scottish 
manufacturing. The largest single sector for 
exports to the rest of the world was the food and 
beverages sector, exporting £4.6 billion in 2007, 
and showing the ongoing importance of this sector 
for Scottish exports.   
 
x For data after 2007, we are reliant on the Index of 
Manufactured Exports, which tracks developments 
in this most important industry. Recent data from 
October 2009 suggest that manufactured exports 
from Scotland fell by 0.7% in real terms between 
Q1 and Q2 2009, down some 8.5% on the level 
one year previously. The greatest declines were in 
chemicals, coke, refined petroleum and nuclear 
fuel and wood, paper, publishing and printing 
(down 6.0% and 12.0% in the last quarter 
respectively). 
 
x In the year to Q2 2009, the biggest declines in 
export activity were reported in metal and non-
metal products sector and textiles, fur and leather 
(down 20.7% and 17.0% respectively). 
 
x As of October 2009, some recent experimental 
data published by the Scottish Government 
through SNAP the cash values of manufacturing 
exports from Scotland to the rest of the World 
showed that ROW exports totalled £3,470 million 
(in current prices). Engineering and allied 
industries was the largest share of these exports, 
worth almost 43% of total manufacturing exports. 
 
x The Global Connections survey provides evidence 
for the most important markets around the world 
for Scottish exports, and dates from 2007. The 
USA was the most common destination for 
Scottish exports, followed by France, the 
Netherlands, Germany and Ireland. The 
downturns in these countries discussed in the 
introduction, sets the background to some difficult 
trading conditions for Scottish exports over 2009. 
It is likely that the growth performance of these 
countries will drive the pace of recovery in 
Scottish aggregate, and manufacturing, export 
demand over the coming years. Longer term, the 
extent to which new markets can be found for 
Scottish goods will be vital for the return to growth 
of the Scottish manufacturing sector. 
 
x Recent IMF and OECD growth forecasts for these 
five key export markets in coming years are given 
in the table below. Readers should note that the 
IMF forecasts date from October 2009, while 
those for the OECD were published in June’s 
Economic Outlook (the next issue of which is due 
to be released before the end of 2009). 
 
x Several points can be noted from the above table 
for forecast growth rates for the export markets for 
Scottish goods. Firstly, US GDP growth is forecast
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Table 1:  Growth forecasts for top five export markets for ROW exports from Scotland, % year on year change, plus 
United Kingdom and Euro Area 
 
  2009 2010 
  IMF OECD IMF OECD 
1 United States -2.7 -2.8 1.5 0.9 
2 France -2.4 -3.0 0.9 0.2 
3 Germany -5.3 -6.1 0.3 0.2 
4 The Netherlands -4.2 -4.9 0.7 -0.4 
5 Ireland -7.5 -9.8 -2.5 -1.5 
      
- United Kingdom -4.4 -4.3 0.9 0.0 
- Euro Area -4.2 -4.8 0.3 0.0 
 
Sources: International Monetary Fund, Regional Economic Outlook: Europe, Securing Recovery, October 2009 and OECD Economic Outlook, 
June 2009 
 
 
Table 2:  Main forecasts of the Scottish economy (central scenario), 2009-2012 
 
 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Gross Value Added -5.0% 0.1% 1.0% 1.6% 
     
Manufacturing -11.3% 0.1% 2.8% 4.2% 
Construction -4.3% 0.2% 0.8% 1.3% 
Services -3.5% 0.1% 0.6% 1.0% 
 
 
Table 3:  Forecasts for aggregate GVA growth in the Scottish economy under three scenarios, 2009-2012 
 
 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 
High growth -4.9% 1.6% 1.8% 2.1% 
Central -5.0% 0.1% 1.1% 1.6% 
Low growth 
 
-5.2% -0.7% -0.1% 0.5% 
 
 
Table 4:  Forecasts of Scottish employment (jobs, 000s) and net employment change in central scenario, 2009-2012 
 
 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Total employment (000s) 2,258 2,228 2,248 2,280 
Net annual change (jobs) (130,776) (29,615) 20,292 31,467 
% annual change -5.5% -1.3% 1.0% 1.4% 
     
Agriculture (jobs, 000s) 29,370 29,518 30,183 31,221 
Annual change -3380 149 665 1038 
Manufacturing 226,949 219,504 226,069 236,272 
Annual change -31354 -7445 6565 10203 
Construction 123,274 114849 115788 117255 
Annual change -14476 -8425 940 1466 
Services 1878,185 1864291 1876413 1895173 
Annual change -81565 -13894 12123 18760 
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Table 5:  Forecast Scottish net jobs growth in three scenarios, 2009-2012 
 
Net job no’s 2009 2010 2011 2012 
High growth -126,915 -352 36,025 44,154 
Previous high forecast -62,827 -23,152 33,584 45,174 
Central scenario -130,776 -29,615 20,292 31,467 
Previous central forecast  -84,399 -51,451 11,301 26,824 
Low growth -134,864 -46,593 -3,409 6,788 
Previous low forecast -103,579 -66,894 -3,722 6,847 
 
 
 
 
Table 6:  Forecasts of Scottish unemployment, central scenario 2009-2012 
 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 
ILO unemployment (000s) 200,082 234,105 212,661 172,815 
Rate1 7.6% 9.2% 8.7% 7.7% 
Claimant count 136,821 160,087 145,423 118,175 
Rate2 4.9% 5.7% 5.2% 4.3% 
 
Notes: 1 = rate calculated as total ILO unemployed divided by total of economically active 16+ population. 2 = rate calculated as claimant count 
divided by sum of claimant count and total jobs. 
 
 
 
Table 7:  ILO unemployment rate and claimant count rate measures of unemployment under each of the three forecast 
scenarios 
 
 2009 2010 2011 2012 
ILO unemployment rate 
High growth 7.2% 7.6% 6.5% 5.0% 
Central 7.6% 9.2% 8.7% 7.7% 
Low growth 8.2% 10.5% 11.0% 11.0% 
     
Claimant count rate 
High growth 4.5% 4.6% 3.7% 2.8% 
Central 4.9% 5.8% 5.2% 4.2% 
Low growth 5.3% 6.7% 6.8% 6.5% 
 
 
 to be stronger in 2009 than 2008 at 1.5%, 
however other key export markets remain weak. 
The fifth largest export market in 2007 was 
Ireland, which is forecast to see a contraction in 
GDP of 2.5% in 2010, lessening any prospect that 
demand from that country could support a growth 
in demand for Scottish goods and services. 
 
x The IMF World Economic Outlook predicts world 
aggregate output will decline by 1.1% in 2010, 
and 2010 is predicted to see stronger growth, with 
world output increasing by 3.1%. These figures 
have been revised upwards since the previous 
World Economic Outlook of July 2009, indicating 
some softening of the most bleak forecasts for the 
world economy. Interestingly, the UK is one of the 
few advanced economies identified by the IMF as  
having its growth forecast for 2009 revised downward 
between July and October 2008. At the same time, UK 
growth in 2010 was revised up between these 
publications. 
 
x The pattern of growth forecasted for 2010 is that 
the strongest growth will be seen in emerging and 
developing countries, such as China (9.0% 
forecast for 2010), India (6.3%) and the “ASEAN-
5” countries of Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Thailand and Vietnam. If exports are to drive the 
Scottish recovery then finding new markets in 
these countries could be important for a quicker 
return to a growth trajectory.
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The forecasts: Background 
As with the most recent forecasts published in the last four 
Economic Commentaries, we have again three alternative 
scenarios for growth, employment and unemployment in 
the Scottish economy: we label the scenario that we feel is 
most likely “central”, with “high growth” and “low growth” as 
two respectively upper and lower growth alternatives. We 
contend that these three scenarios capture the range of 
outcomes that are possible, given that there are 
considerable uncertainties surrounding any specific single 
or point estimates to the “central” forecast. The significant 
revisions to GDP growth forecasts discussed above and 
seen particularly over the last year, suggest that a 
scenarios approach is sensible in the current uncertain 
economic climate – when first estimates of growth may be 
revised significantly some quarters into the future. While 
not presently explicit probabilities for each of these 
outcomes, we forecast that the “central” scenario is that 
which is most likely, while the “high growth” and “low 
growth” scenarios reveal the range of possible outcomes 
for the Scottish economy foreseen for future developments 
from November 2009 through 2010 to 2012. 
 
 
The forecasts: Detail 
In the three scenarios considered, the following features 
are assumed to influence the factors of demand, and 
economic activity, across the Scottish economy: 
 
Household  
In the central scenario, we forecast a significant reduction 
in household expenditure in 2009, slowly recovering 
through 2010, but still slightly down on 2009 levels, 
although returning to increasing expenditure from 2011 and 
into 2012. In the low scenario, household expenditure is 
damaged through lower consumer confidence and 
persistent unemployment. Spending falls in 2009, 2010 and 
(slightly) in 2011 in this scenario. In the high scenario, 
consumer confidence rebounds faster than expected in our 
central scenario, returning to positive growth (albeit, 
gingerly) in 2010 before returning to trend increases in 
expenditure through 2011 and 2012. This scenario could 
be consistent with lower than currently expected increases 
in joblessness, and recovery of consumer confidence, 
supported by access to, and demand for, household credit 
facilities.  
 
Government  
In the central scenario we forecast an increase in 
government spending through 2009, with a reduced 
increase in spending in 2010. From 2011 we forecast 
increasingly large annual reductions in aggregate 
spending, which are reduced by 2.0% in 2012. In the high 
(low) scenario, government spending also falls from 2011, 
but by smaller (higher) amounts, in part supported by 
assumed economic activity keeping taxation income higher 
(lower) than is assumed in the central case. 
 
Exports 
In the central scenario we forecast a slow return to growth 
in world trade in 2009, with a return to positive growth (as 
predicted by the IMF in October 2009) in 2010 and 
continuing through 2011 and 2012. This is reflected in a 
forecast demand for exports to the rest of the world from 
Scotland. Such a response could be indicative of Scottish 
exports securing markets in developing economies, which 
are forecast to see high levels of economic growth over the 
coming years, while more developed countries are 
predicted to see slower increases in growth. Recent 
changes in growth forecasts are discussed in the section 
above. In the high and low growth scenarios, this return to 
positive growth in exports takes less and more time 
respectively. Exports to the rest of UK follow a similar 
pattern in the central case, returning to positive growth in 
2010. In the low scenario we forecast a small increase in 
export demand from the rest of the UK in 2010. 
 
Tourism 
Tourism is assumed to recover from challenging conditions 
through 2008 and 2009 in our central case, by 2010, 
seeing some sustained growth in 2011 and 2012. Under 
the High scenario, significant growth is seen in aggregate 
tourism spending in 2010, perhaps reflecting faster than 
anticipated recoveries in growth in markets important for 
Scottish tourism, and the habits formed by Scottish 
households through increased domestic holidays in 2009. 
 
Investment and stocks 
As discussed above, 2009 has seen significant reductions 
in investment demands as the economic environment has 
worsened. Most commentators expect the recovery in 
investment to be partly driven by the supply of credit, but 
also the demand for credit from companies, which will be 
explicitly linked with returning business confidence. A 
number of Scottish Engineering and Scottish Chamber 
survey respondents anticipated increasing profitability over 
the next twelve months, hinting that there is some optimism 
for increasing investment. We forecast that aggregate 
investment levels in 2010 will remain lower than 2009, 
albeit only slightly, and begin to increase from 2011. Our 
high scenario sees investment increasing from 2009 levels 
in 2010, although the increase is forecast to be small. 
 
Results 
 
Gross Value Added 
The forecast GVA for Scotland in 2009 under all three 
scenarios is negative. We forecast all three scenarios out 
to 2012, by which time GVA growth in all scenarios is 
forecast to be positive, although the time path of changes 
is faster in the High growth scenario, and lower in the Low 
growth scenario. Scotland is forecast to return to positive 
growth in 2010 in both the Central (0.1%) and High growth 
(+1.7%) scenario, but the Low growth scenario sees 
negative growth in 2011 (-0.7 and -0.1).
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Figure 1:  GVA growth 2008 and forecasts to 2012, Scotland and the UK 
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Figure 2: Forecasts of GVA growth in manufacturing, 2009-2012 
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These scenarios are presented in Figure 1, alongside (for 
comparison) the average of new forecasts (i.e. those made 
in the last three months to November 2009) for the UK as a 
whole. Forecasts for the UK in 2011 and 2012 were 
collected by HM Treasury in October 2009, and these are 
also shown in Figure 1. The average of independent 
forecasts for the UK in each of 2011 and 2012 remain 
unchanged from those reported in June 2009’s 
Commentary. 
 
We are forecasting that the Scottish economy will perform 
less strongly than the UK in 2009 in all three scenarios, 
while less well (0.7%) than the average of independent 
forecasts for the UK in 2010 (1.2%) in our Central scenario. 
As with previous experience of recessions (discussed in 
detail in June 2009’s Fraser Economic Commentary, and 
for the reasons given above), we anticipate the Central 
scenario will see a slower return to growth in Scotland than 
the UK as a whole, with all scenarios forecasting lower 
growth in Scotland than the average of independent 
forecasts for the UK in 2011 and 2012. 
 
Under the Central scenario, GVA growth returns to positive 
annual growth in 2010 (+0.1%) and 2011 (+1.0%). In 2012, 
Scottish growth is forecast to be 1.6%. Our central scenario 
for 2009, and the forecast for the sectors under this 
scenario are given in Table 2. Table 3 shows the GVA 
forecasts under each of the three scenarios. Under the Low 
growth scenario, negative growth is also seen in 2009, 
2010 and 2011, with the Scottish economy not returning to 
positive growth in this scenario until 2012.  
 
We also present forecasts for GVA change in Scotland at 
broad industry levels for manufacturing and services, as 
well as the construction sector, under each of the three 
scenarios – Central, High growth and Low growth. Figure 2 
shows the GVA change in Manufacturing under each of 
these three scenarios, while Figure 3 shows the GVA 
change in Services. Figure 4 shows the change in 
forecasted GVA annually in the construction sector 
between 2009 and 2012. 
 
Across the aggregate manufacturing sector (shown in 
Figure 2), a recovering from negative GVA growth in 2009 
occurs in 2010 in the Central scenario, although there is a 
small positive GVA growth forecast for 2010 under the High 
growth scenario. In 2011 and 2012, all three scenarios 
forecast positive GVA growth in the manufacturing sector, 
with growth ranging from 2.1 to 5.1% in 2012. Key to the 
speed of this recovery will be the growth of external 
demand for products, which have been revised upwards 
since June’s commentary due to the revisions for growth, 
and demand for imports, in key Scottish manufacturing 
export markets seen since June’s commentary.  
 
Employment 
Our forecasts for employment for each of the three 
scenarios are given in Table 4, along with the net 
aggregate employment change over the year. The 
employment figures relate to jobs, not FTEs, and are 
calibrated on the Employers’ Quarterly Survey Series, as 
given in Table 6.06 of the Economic and Labour Market 
Review, published by National Statistics. This gave total 
jobs in Scotland over the year 2008, as 2,387,500. As we 
have previously forecast, we anticipate in our Central 
scenario that total employment in Scotland will fall in 
aggregate in both 2009 and 2010. 
 
In the Central scenario, employment is forecast to decline 
by 130,776 in 2009 and by 29,615 jobs in 2010. Job 
numbers begin to increase in 2011 and 2012. Total jobs in 
2012 are forecast to be around 109,000 lower than the jobs 
total for 2008 (a year when historic highs and lows 
respectively for the employment rate and unemployment 
rate were seen in Scotland). The Low growth scenario 
forecasts that around 103,500 jobs are lost in 2009, and a 
further 67,000 in 2010. In that scenario, total jobs lost 
between 2009 and 2012 are 167,000, while in the High 
growth scenario, the recovery in 2011 and 2012 sees job 
numbers recover towards their previously measured 
historical highs, and job numbers in 2012 are around 7,000 
lower than their level in 2008. In all scenarios, total job 
numbers decline in 2009 and 2010. 
 
Table 5 shows the net annual growth in jobs in each of the 
three scenarios, and how these have changed since our 
last forecast. 
 
Looking at the sectoral breakdown for these employment 
changes, in all scenarios the Services sector sees the 
largest decline in job numbers in both 2009 and 2010. 
Overall, the number of service sector jobs are forecast to 
fall by 81,565 in 2009 and a further decline of 13,894 in 
2010. Financial services is forecast to be especially badly 
affected, losing almost 14,849 jobs in 2009 and 11616 jobs 
in 2010, but large job losses in 2009 are also forecast in 
real estate and business services, retail and wholesale, 
and hotels and catering sectors.  
 
The construction sector is forecast to lose around 14,476 
jobs in 2009, and a further 8,425 in 2010, and see a slow 
recovery through 2011 and 2012. As with the aggregate 
jobs total, the total jobs in construction in 2012 remain 
below levels of 2008. In the High growth scenario, job 
losses in construction are smaller in 2009, and fall by over 
14,000 while recovering to job growth of over 2000 in 2012. 
As mentioned earlier in this section, the construction sector 
has tended to see both quicker, and earlier, declines than 
the rest of the economy, and in previous upswings would 
be likely to see increased activity ahead of much of the 
economy. The slower than previous growth in the private 
housing sector may contribute to the upswing increase 
being less than in following previous recessions in 
Scotland. 
 
Manufacturing jobs fall in 2009 by over 31,000 in the 
Central scenario, with a range from 32,232 to 30,433 in the 
Low and High growth scenarios respectively. Within this 
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Figure 3: Forecasts of GVA growth in services, 2009-2012 
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Figure 4:  Forecasts of GVA growth in construction, 2009-2012 
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broad sector, the most heavily hit sectors in 2009 will be 
those which rely upon export markets for the destination of 
their output, and so falls in employment are forecast in 
metals and non-metal products (down 3,829), mechanical 
engineering (down 3,098) and mining and quarrying (down 
3,636). Key to the response in the labour market will be the 
extent to which labour hoarding occurs in the face of the 
recession, and evidence suggests that while there have 
been some increase in anecdotal labour hoarding, there 
has been growing unemployment on the most recent data. 
This might suggest that the impact on jobs could be more 
significant than was initially felt earlier this year. When 
positive GVA growth does reappear, perhaps through 2010 
in our Central and High scenarios, it may be beyond 2012 
before we see the numbers in employment reaching the 
highs for employment seen in 2007. 
 
Unemployment 
We present our forecasts for unemployment for 2009-2012 
in Scotland, as measured by the ILO definition as well as 
those claiming unemployment benefit, in Table 6. The 
preferred measure of unemployment is the ILO definition, 
as given by the Labour Force Survey. This measure is 
preferred as it reveals the extent of labour which is 
unemployed and available for work, rather than that portion 
of the available Scottish labour force which is currently in 
receipt of unemployment benefit. 
 
The forecasts for unemployment in 2009 and through 
2010-2012 have been revised upwards from forecasts 
published in the last Fraser Economic Commentary, given 
the speed of the reduction in employment and increasing 
unemployment observed in the first quarter of 2009, and in 
line with our revision downwards of our central scenario 
forecasts for Scottish GVA in 2009. Until the recent  
economic downturn, the Scottish labour market had been 
outperforming that of the UK when measured by 
employment rate, and had seen historically high levels of 
employment and low levels of unemployment. Of crucial 
importance to realised levels of unemployment will be the 
extent to which people who lose employment switch into 
the unemployed, or move into labour inactivity, i.e. 
unemployed but not available for work. As of November 
2009, and as reported in the Chief Economic Advisor’s 
report, the increase in the Scottish ILO unemployment rate 
in Scotland over the last year (2.7 percentage points) was 
greater than the increase in the UK as a whole (up 2.4 
percentage points). 
 
Table 7 shows the ILO and claimant count measures of 
unemployment under each of the three scenarios of our 
forecasts. 
 
____________________ 
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 Review of Scottish  
Business Surveys 
 
Overall 
A sense of rising confidence and improving business 
activity was increasingly evident in business surveys over 
the summer months, although this did not apply to all 
sectors. In July Scottish Engineering, commenting on the 
results for the second quarter, noted that ‘manufacturing 
remains in the doldrums’ and whilst there was a marginal 
improvement in orders the ‘green shoots of recovery have 
yet to appear.’ In October it noted, in response to the 
survey results for the third quarter, ‘manufacturing looks to 
be turning the corner’, and ‘capacity utilisation creeps up’.  
The CBI Scottish Industrial Trends in the second quarter 
noted the rate of decline in domestic and export orders 
eased, but there were ‘few signs of export improvement.  
The Scottish CBI noted the continuing concerns as to 
finance and the deflation in both export and domestic 
prices. By September the Markit UK Regional PMI (the 
Scottish version is no longer published) reported an 
improvement in business activity in Scotland, although the 
rate of improvement was slower than in other UK regions. 
The Lloyds TSB monitor (September 2009) indicated ‘the 
Scottish economy is on track to exit recession later this 
year’, although noted that the Scottish economy has not yet 
returned to growth ‘but is nearer to the point of turnaround 
between decline and growth’. 
 
The Scottish Chambers’ Business Survey reported in July 
that there was much clearer evidence in the results for the 
second quarter that the first stage of the recession, a 
period of sharp decline in confidence, orders, sales and 
activity, is coming to an end, and there are more signs of 
both an easing in the rate of decline, and signs of some 
pick up in orders and activity and recruitment, although 
pressures on margins remain at high levels. At the end of 
the third quarter it reported ‘clear signs of an emerging 
recovery in manufacturing and a ‘good summer’ in tourism, 
with rising confidence in manufacturing, wholesale 
distribution and tourism, together with a lessening in the 
decline in confidence in construction and retail.’ 
 
Data from the Scottish Chambers’ Business Survey 
illustrates well the trends in business confidence since 
2006. Across most sectors rising net trends in business 
confidence were reported in the first half of 2007. These 
were followed by sharp and ferocious declines in 2008 and 
the first quarter of 2009, with net trends of over 60% of 
manufacturing and 70% of construction, wholesale, retail 
and tourism respondents reporting declining confidence. 
Rising net trends re-emerged in manufacturing in Q2 2009 
and strengthened significantly in Q3 2009. In contrast 
confidence remained negative in construction and rose 
only marginally in tourism. 
 
Data from the Scottish Chambers’ Business Survey 
suggests pay pressures remained subdued through the 
summer. The percentages of respondents increasing pay 
in the third quarter ranged from 3% of construction to 21% 
of manufacturing, and average pay increases ranged from 
2.1% in manufacturing to 4.5% in retail. Average pay 
increases in manufacturing and construction remain at 
historically low levels. Recruitment activity in all sectors 
remained low ranging from 19% in construction, 23% in 
retail to 37% in manufacturing and 59% in tourism; 
 
Oil and Gas 
The severe downturn in oil and gas prices continued to 
impact on activity and investment plans. The leading 
organisation in the sector, Oil and Gas UK, reported that 
capital investment in 2008 was some 6% lower than in 
2007 and is anticipated to ease through 2009 and 2010. 
More recently Subsea UK noted ‘the short term outlook 
remains tough’ as operators sought to cut costs and reduce 
activity, and only forecasts an improvement in activity in 
2010. 
 
Production 
The latest Lloyds TSB reported production businesses still 
experiencing difficult conditions, ‘although the rate of 
decline has been arrested’.  It noted the recession in 
production is deeper and longer lasting than in services, 
and the production sector is further away from a return to 
growth.  According to Markit UK Regional PMI Scotland 
recorded only a marginal increase in private sector output 
during October.  
 
 
Manufacturing 
 
Optimism 
Both Scottish Engineering and Scottish Chambers reported 
rising confidence trends in business confidence in the third 
quarter.  Scottish Chambers noted business confidence 
improved further in the third quarter rising strongly from a 
net balance of 9% in Q2 to 32%, whilst Scottish 
Engineering reported a net balance of 20% for the same 
quarter. Declining confidence was only reported by 10% of 
Scottish Chambers manufacturing and 14% respondents of 
Scottish Engineering respondents.  
 
Orders and Sales 
Scottish Chamber and CBI respondents reported the 
outturn in total new orders and export orders was 
marginally better than expected and the actual trends in 
total, Scottish and rest of UK orders, whilst remain weak, 
are better than in previous quarters. There was a further 
improvement in export orders. In contrast Scottish 
Engineering reported continuing net declines in orders, 
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Total orders/contracts (net balances)             Source:  Scottish Chambers’ Business Survey 
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although at reduced rates over the previous two quarters. 
Both Scottish Chambers and Scottish Engineering 
respondents reported an improvement in the trend in 
export demand, although this was stronger amongst 
Scottish Chamber respondents 
 
Scottish Chamber respondents reported a continuation of 
the declining trend in the level of work in progress, but the 
rate of decline was slower than in the second quarter. 
Average capacity used rose marginally by 0.8 percentage 
points to 71.6%, although 57% (71% in quarter 2) reported 
capacity used was below preferred levels. Pressures to 
raise prices continued to moderate.   
 
Investment 
Both Scottish Engineering and Scottish Chambers reported 
negative trends in investment. Overall investment trends 
eased and only 16% expect to increase investment and 5% 
anticipate increasing their leasing of equipment over the 
coming year.  Cash flow trends continued to ease, but at a 
more modest rate than in the past four quarters. The 
anticipated trends in turnover and profitability improved 
with 40% and 34% of respondents respectively reporting 
an increase over the twelve months to September 2010; 
although once again Scottish Engineering respondents are 
more cautious as to price trends. 
 
Employment 
Two thirds of Scottish Chamber respondents reported and 
expect no change in total employment levels with a small 
net balance reporting a decline. Scottish Engineering 
respondents likewise reported a decline in both 
employment and hours worked and expect the decline to 
continue through the fourth quarter. The CBI respondents 
were more confident and anticipate a slight rise in 
employment in the fourth quarter.  
 
Construction 
 
Optimism   
Data from the Scottish Chambers’ Business Survey 
suggested that business confidence remained weak 
through the third quarter, with only 11% reporting being 
more confident compared to the previous quarter. Thirty-six 
per cent, compared to over 42% of respondents in quarter 
two, reported being less confident.  The net trend in 
business optimism remained negative, only improving 
marginally from -27% in quarter 2 to -25% in quarter three. 
 
Contracts   
The rate of decline in the net trend in new contracts 
increased from -30% in the second quarter to -40%.  The 
trends in orders from all sectors continued to decline 
although the rate of decline in public sector orders eased.  
Demand remained depressed with 50% reporting 
downward trends in total new orders and 72% declining 
levels of domestic/house build contracts. The proportion 
reporting working below optimum levels rose slightly to a 
net of 75%. 
 
Expectations as to turnover trends over the next year 
remained depressed, although did not deteriorate further in 
the third quarter.  A net of -31% (-37%, -64%, -65%, and -
37% in the previous four quarters) anticipate declining 
turnover trends over the next year.  A net of -44% (-59% -
78%, -78% and -54% in the previous four quarters) 
anticipate declining profitability over the next twelve 
months. And a net of 64% of construction firms anticipate 
declining tender margins over the next twelve months.  
 
Average capacity rose by two percentage points to 74% 
but 50% (44% in the previous survey) expect a declining 
trend in the level of work in progress. 
 
Employment   
A third of firms reduced total employment levels with only 
6% reporting an increase in employment and recruitment 
again remained at very low levels. Only 3% of respondents 
reported increasing pay in the third quarter by an average 
of 3.5%. 
 
The service sector 
The latest Lloyds TSB Business Monitor noted a marked 
easing in the rate of decline in turnover in new and repeat 
business in the service sector, and suggested the Scottish 
service sector is close to where growth will be resumed. 
Expectations for the next six months are more positive than 
in previous quarters, and a net of 3% of service firms 
anticipate increasing turnover in the six months to February 
2010. 
 
Retail distribution 
The Scottish Retail Consortium’s Monitor for September 
reported increased sales ‘Customers’ mood improving’ as 
like for like sales were 1.5% higher than in September 
2008 and total sales were up 4.3% on a year ago. 
Underpinning these figures was the increase in food sales 
(up 2.4% on a like for like basis). However, firms remain 
cautious and discounting of prices remains widespread. 
 
Optimism   
The Scottish Chambers survey for the third quarter 
reported that the long running negative trend in business 
confidence eased further from -27% to -8% (the least 
depressed figure since quarter 4 2007).  However, more 
than half of firms were less confident compared to the 
same quarter one year ago.  
 
Sales    
Scottish Chambers survey data for the retail sector reports 
unwweighted sales trends, as such the trends reflect the 
trends reported by independent retailers as well as the 
major multiple retailers, this tends to understate the overall 
trends in sales   The proportion of respondents reporting 
and expecting declining sales in the third and fourth 
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quarters remains historically high.  Nevertheless the rate of 
decline in actual and expected sales has continued to 
ease. Almost half of respondents reported and expect 
declining sales trends. 
 
The value of total new sales declined for 45% (64% in 
quarter two) of firms and 41% (68% in quarter two) expect 
a further decline during the three months to the end of 
December 2009. 
 
Finance  
A net of -15% of retailers anticipate declining turnover 
(compared to -49% in the previous quarter), and a net of -
36% (-51% in the previous quarter) anticipate declining 
profitability over the next year, suggesting continued 
pressures on margins, although perhaps beginning to 
ease.  
 
Employment     
For a further quarter no responding retail firms increased 
total employment levels and only a small number expect to 
increase total employment levels during the three months 
to the end of December. Only 23% of firms attempted to 
recruit, although historically low it was an improvement 
compared to quarter two (18%). Nineteen percent of firms 
increased wages by 4.51%. 
 
Tourism 
 
Optimism 
According to the Scottish Chambers’ Business Survey the 
overall level of business confidence remained positive in 
the third quarter and unchanged from the previous quarter, 
and was stronger than in the same quarter in 2008.  A net 
balance of firms also reported being more confident 
compared to one year ago. 
  
Demand   
Both Visit Scotland and Scottish Chambers reported better 
trends in the summer than in the previous year. Visit 
Scotland data for June indicated a two percentage point 
increase over the June 2008, July indicated a five 
percentage point increase in bed occupancy compared to 
July 2008 and the August 2009 suggests a two percentage 
point rise in room occupancy over the same month in 2008. 
Scottish Chambers reported the outturn in the third quarter 
was better than anticipated. Forty-four percent, compared 
to 21% in quarter two reported increased demand for 
accommodation.  The trends in demand from Scotland and 
RUK improved for the first time since quarter four 2007. 
Demand from abroad and business trade continued to 
decline but the rates of decline eased.  Average occupancy 
rose from 54% to 72.7% (marginally higher than in Q3 
2008, but lower than in Q3 2007).  
 
Data from Visit Scotland indicated average hotel bed 
occupancy for August 2009 was 66% and for 80% room 
occupancy. Visit Scotland data noted that whilst nationally 
the average length of stay has dropped slightly over the 
past year, this has not been the case in all regions, with 
Edinburgh and Dumfries & Galloway reporting the larger 
increased duration of stays. Additionally Visit Scotland data 
suggested less evidence of visitors moving to lower graded 
hotels. 
 
Looking forward to the fourth quarter, Scottish Chambers 
noted respondents expecting to reduce room rates and the 
discounting of prices were anticipated to be widespread.  
  
Employment   
Scottish Chambers data for the third quarter noted changes 
in employment levels were reported by fewer than half of 
firms. Net declining trends in full time (-21%), part time (-
18%), seasonal   (-51%) and overtime working (-56%) were 
reported. 
 
Outlook   
Scottish Chambers data suggest manufacturing trends in 
the third quarter offer the clearest signs of an emerging 
recovery, tourism has benefitted from a good summer, but 
pressures on margins may cause problems in the fourth 
quarter. However, uncertainty, fears of the recovery 
stagnating, and limited capital spending remain concerns. 
Generally for Scottish firms working levels remain well 
below optimum levels in manufacturing and construction, 
and competition for demand/sales remains widespread in 
retail and tourism leading to widespread and early 
seasonal discounting of prices. Pressures on margins and 
likely pressures on raw material and other costs highlight 
the fragility of the recovery. The labour market remains 
weak with few signs of an improvement for the fourth 
quarter.  
 
 
Eleanor Malloy/Cliff Lockyer 
November 2009 
 
____________________ 
 
Current trends in Scottish Business are regularly reported by a 
number of business surveys. This report draws on: 
 
1. The Confederation of British Industries Scottish Industrial 
Trends Survey for the second and third quarters of 2009;  
2.  Lloyds TSB Business Monitor 47 for the quarters June – August 
2009 and expectations to February 2010; 
3. Scottish Engineering’s Quarterly Reviews for the second and 
third quarters 2009;  
4. The Markit Economics Regional Monthly Purchasing Managers’ 
Index to end September 2009 and Markit UK Regional PMI Nov 
2009; 
5. The Scottish Retail Consortium’s Monthly Scottish Retail Sales 
Monitor for September 2009; 
6. The Scottish Chambers of Commerce Quarterly Business 
Survey, reports for the second and third quarters of 2009;  
7. Oil & Gas UK 2008 Activity Survey; 
8. Visit Scotland Occupancy Survey August 2009. 
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Overview of the 
labour market 
 
Inevitably current interest in the Scottish labour market 
continues to focus on the trends and patterns in the 
unemployment figures and again in this issue we note 
recent changes in Scottish labour market trends. Initially, 
however, the increasing recognition of the likelihood of 
widespread job losses in public sector and recent disputes 
involving postal services and threats of industrial action by 
British Airways cabin crew prompt a consideration of both 
the trends in public sector employment and of trade union 
membership. 
 
In quarter 2 2009 there were 572,200 employed in the 
Scottish public sector (excluding the 6.9% or 42,500 
employed by RBS and Lloyds who have been reclassified 
as public corporations), of which 44.6% were employed in 
local government (excluding police and fire services) and 
26.3% in the NHS. Recent changes in the numbers 
employed within local government have been affected by 
the transfers of local government departments to arms 
length external organisations, most recently being the 
transfer of Glasgow City’s Direct and Care Services 
department to an ALEO, one of a number of such 
developments affecting culture and sport, community and 
safety services.  
 
The numbers employed (full time equivalents) in Scottish 
local authorities are as follows: 56,800 teachers, 40,00 
other education staff; 43,600 in social work; 29,300 in 
police and related services; 5,700 in fire services and 
85,500 other staff. The numbers employed by local 
authority (excluding police and fire service staff) range from 
over 23,700 in Glasgow City; between 15,000 and 19,300 
in Edinburgh City; North and South Lanarkshire to under 
5000 in East Lothian, East Renfrewshire, Inverclyde, 
Midlothian, Orkney and Shetland. Initial proposals by a 
number of councils indicate that these numbers are likely to 
reduce quite significantly over the next few years. 
 
Concerns that recent industrial disputes and the onset of 
public sector cuts will herald a period of more substantial 
industrial unrest and a new ‘winter of discontent’ paralleling 
the disputes in 1978 – 79, by mainly local authority  
employees, need to balance the changed landscape of 
employment patterns, legislation and trade union 
membership levels with the distribution of union 
membership. Nationally in 1979 trade union membership 
was some 13 million, or 55.4% of the workforce. In 2008 
union membership was 6.9 million and union density had 
fallen to 27.4% of all employees (or 25.3% of all 
employed). In Scotland union density was 32.9% in 2008, 
this ranged from 65.6% of public sector and 17.5% of 
private sector employees. However, union membership 
remains highest in public administration and defence, 
education, electricity, gas and water supply and in health 
and social work, and given the nature of the sector and 
historical bargaining arrangements the public sector has 
been a major contributor to the number of days lost in 
recent years (in 2002 two disputes in public administration 
accounted for some 60% of days lost). 
 
Recent trends and statistics  
Comparable figures on the labour market1 between 
Scotland and the United Kingdom in the quarter July – 
September 2009 are summarised in Table 1. Labour Force 
Survey (LFS) data show that in the quarter to September 
2009 the level of employment in Scotland fell by 3 
thousand, to 2,500 thousand. Over the year to September 
2009, employment in Scotland fell by 56 thousand. For the 
same period, UK employment fell by 490 thousand. The 
Scottish employment rate – those in employment as a 
percentage of the working age population – was 73.9 per 
cent, down 2.4 per cent compared to one year earlier.  For 
the same period the UK employment rate was 72.5 per 
cent, down 1.9 per cent compared to one year earlier. 
 
In considering employment, activity and unemployment 
rates it is important to remember the bases and 
relationships of these figures.  LFS data is provided for: (1) 
all aged 16 and over and (2) for all aged 59/64. The first 
measure (all aged 16 and over) leads to higher numbers in 
employment, in the total economically active and 
economically inactive – but reduces the economic activity 
rates and unemployment rates, but at the same time 
increases the economically inactive rate. Conversely the 
second measure (all aged 16 to 59/64) leads to lower 
numbers economically active, in employment and 
economically inactive – but leads to a higher economically 
active, employment and unemployment rates but lower 
economically inactive rates. 
 
The relationships between employment, unemployment 
totally economically active and inactive are important in 
appreciating changing levels of employment and 
unemployment, and changes in the employment rates 
should be seen in conjunction with changes in the activity 
rates.  If people leave employment and become 
unemployed (but are still economically active) the 
unemployment rate increases, but the economically active 
rate remains unchanged. However, if people leave 
employment and do not seek employment, as seems to be 
an emerging pattern, they are categorised as economically 
inactive, as such the unemployment rate remains 
unchanged whilst the activity and inactivity rates change. 
 
Table 1 shows that for Scotland the preferred International 
Labour Organisation (ILO) measure of unemployment rose 
significantly to 194 thousand, between July - September 
2009, or by 67 thousand over the year2. The ILO 
unemployment rate rose in the three months September 
2009 and now stands at 7.2 per cent. This represents a 0.2 
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Table 1:  Headline indicators of Scottish and UK labour market, July - September 2009 
 
July - September 
2009  Scotland 
Change on 
quarter 
Change on 
year United Kingdom 
Change on 
quarter 
Change on 
year 
Employment* 
 
Level (000s) 2,500 -3 -56 28,927  6 -490 
Rate (%) 73.9 -0.1 -2.4 72.5 -0.1 -1.9 
        
Unemployment** 
Level (000s)          194  4 67 2,461  30 629 
Rate (%) 7.2 0.2 2.5 7.8 0.1 2 
        
Activity* 
Level (000s)       2,694  2 11 31,389  35 140 
Rate (%) 79.8 0.1 -0.3 78.9 -0.1 -0.2 
        
Inactivity*** 
Level (000s)        653  -2 13 7,997 41 132 
Rate (%) 20.2 -0.1 0.3       21.1  0.1 0.2 
 
 
Source: Labour Market Statistics (First Release), Scotland and UK, November 2009  
 
  * Levels are for those aged 16+, while rates are for those of working age (16-59/64) 
 ** Levels and rates are for those aged 16+, rates are proportion of economically active. 
*** Levels and rates for those of working age (16-59/64) 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 2:  Employee jobs by industry, Scotland, June 2009 
 
All jobs 
(seasonally 
adjusted) 
All 
jobs 
Agriculture, 
Forestry 
and Fishing 
Mining 
Energy and 
Water 
Supplies 
Industries 
Man-
ufacturing 
Industries Construction 
Distribution 
etc, transport 
etc, finance 
and business 
services 
Education, 
health, 
public 
admin and 
other 
services 
SIC 2003 
Section  A-O A,B C,E D F H-K L-O 
Sep 05 2,373 2,373 32 37 232 129 1,102 842 
Mar 06 2,376 2,368 31 36 224 135 1,094 848 
Sep 06 2,361 2,360 33 38 224 138 1,085 841 
Mar 07 2,380 2,371 34 41 222 145 1,082 847 
Sep 07 2,389 2,389 33 43 222 139 1,108 844 
Dec 07 2,391 2,400 25 42 220 139 1,127 847 
Mar 08 2,392 2,382 28 42 218 137 1,109 849 
Jun 08  2,396 2,396 35 42 216 136 1,114 853 
Sep 08 2,389 2,387 35 41 216 138 1,104 852 
Dec 08 2,374 2,385 33 41 212 140 1,103 856 
Mar 09 2,362 2,354 37 40 206 139 1,075 858 
Jun 09 2,339 2,339 29 41 203 130 1,074 861 
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Table 3: Claimant count by age and duration (computerised claims only) percentage change over year to October 2009 
 
 
 All computerised 
claims 
Up to 6 months Over 6 and up to 12 
months  
All over 12 months 
All 16+ numbers 128,900 87,900 26,400 14,700 
All 16+ % change over year 55 39 115.1 89.6 
     
All 18 – 24 change over year 52.6 39.3 160.7 147.9 
All 25- 49 change over year 55.5 38.3 105.2 86.7 
All 50 and over change over year 60.4 42.4 104.1 88.5 
 
 
 
per cent rise over the last quarter and a 2.4 per cent rise 
relative to the same period a year earlier. The comparable 
ILO unemployment rate for the UK stands at 7.8 per cent, 
and is up 0.1 per cent over the most recent quarter, and up 
2 per cent over the year.  
 
The economically active workforce includes those 
individuals actively seeking employment and those 
currently in employment (i.e. self-employed, government 
employed, unpaid family workers and those on training 
programmes). Table 1 shows that the level of the 
economically active rose by 0.1 per cent between July and 
September 2009. There were 2,694 thousand economically 
active people in Scotland during Q3 2009. This comprised 
2,500 thousand in employment and 194 thousand ILO 
unemployed. The level for those of working age 
economically inactive fell in the last quarter, down 0.1 per 
cent on the previous quarter to 653 thousand people. This 
indicates an increase of 0.3 per cent in the number of 
people of working age economically inactive over the last 
year.  
 
The most recent (seasonally adjusted) figure for 
Jobseekers allowance claimants in Scotland stood at 134.8 
thousand in October 2009, up 46.9 thousand or 55.3% over 
the year. The claimant count rate in October 2009 stood at 
4.8 per cent. This is up 1.7 per cent over the year. The UK 
claimant count rate in October 2009 was 5.1 per cent, 
unchanged from the previous month and up 1.9 per cent 
over the year. 
 
Unemployment date at the Scottish constituency level for 
July 2009 is available in a SPICe Briefing, with more recent 
figures available in November. 
http://www.scottish.parliament.uk/business/research/briefin
gs-09/SB09-56.pdf 
  
The most recent figures for the number of employee jobs 
by industrial activity are detailed in Table 2. Employee job 
figures are a measure of jobs rather than people. Total 
seasonally adjusted employee jobs for the quarter ending 
June 2009 (the latest available figures) stood at 2,339 
thousand. The number of jobs in the manufacturing 
industry continues to fall, and now stands at 203 thousand, 
down 3,000 on the previous quarter, and down 13 
thousand against the same quarter one year earlier. The 
number of jobs in the service industry fell by 1,000 over the 
last quarter to 1,074 thousand, and there are now 30 
thousand fewer jobs in the service industry than the same 
period ending a year earlier.  
 
Table 3 provides some limited indications of the experience 
of unemployment in terms of claimant count by age and 
duration. The pattern over the year suggests a higher 
percentage rise in claimants over 50, but significantly it is 
the age group 18 – 24 that has witnessed the largest 
percentage increase in unemployment over 6 months, 
although the numbers are low. Over the past years the 
numbers of 18 – 24 who have been claiming Job Seekers 
allowance over 6 and up to 12 months has increased by 
3,800 and for those over 12 months by has risen by 500.  
 
Outlook  
In the year to September 2009 the total in employment fell 
by 56,000 and unemployment rose by 67,000 to 194,000 
and the numbers economically inactive rose by 13,000 
over the year. The trend in unemployment is increasing 
and the latest rate is significantly higher than a year ago. In 
the year to March 2009 (the latest available data) the 
percentage declines in part-time and temporary workers 
were higher than that for full time workers. Over the next 
quarters the scale of job looses in finance and the public 
sector may be clearer. For both part-time and temporary 
workers the inability to find either a full time or a permanent 
job was more evident than a year ago. The ‘flexible 
workforce’ has been cited as one reason for unemployment 
rates to be lower than had been feared, but the limits to 
flexibility may be approaching.  
 
Rationalisation in both the private and public sectors will 
contribute to unemployment in the short and medium term. 
Within the private sector the initiatives by British Airways, 
Diageo and the banks are likely to be followed by other 
companies seeking to rationalise production/services and 
reduce costs. Within local government the flow of 
announcements of actual and planned job reductions is 
increasing and is set to increase more substantially in 
2010. 
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Endnotes:  
1The Census 2001-consistent population figures at local authority 
level were released in February 2003. This has allowed the 
production of interim regional LFS estimates. The population data 
only cover the periods up to mid-2001. The data presented here 
are taken mainly from Labour Market Statistics, May 2008 and are 
consistent with the updated LFS data available on NOMIS from 
Summer 2004. Labour Market Statistics continue to report data for 
Scotland at the quarterly level, so this will continue to form the 
basis of our analysis of movements in the labour market between 
quarters.  
 
2The Labour Force Survey definition of ILO unemployment takes 
precedence over the claimant count measure. ILO unemployment 
is much less sensitive to changes in the regulations governing 
unemployment benefit, and conforms to a widely accepted 
standard to allow for more meaningful cross-country comparisons.  
 
 
Cliff Lockyer 
November  2009 
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Introduction 
 
 “The defence industry is vital to Scotland”1 
 
The above quote from the recent House of Commons 
Scottish Affairs Committee report concerns the volume of 
economic activity that the defence industry supports in 
Scotland. We examine this issue below and find that it can 
be difficult to accurately establish the importance of 
defence to the Scottish economy. Defence issues are 
ultimately political decisions and we also argue that this 
dearth of information is important in the light of a number of 
political developments that could potentially affect the 
contribution that defence makes to Scotland. We discuss a 
number of these developments and attempt where possible 
to gauge their impact, but it is clear that our ability to make 
rational choices on defence would be improved by an 
improved set of figures on the economic consequences of 
defence decisions.  
 
The significance of defence at a community level is well 
illustrated by the UK Government’s recent decision to 
cancel its planned restructuring of the missile testing site in 
the Western Isles. The decision to cancel, which would 
have saved an estimated £50 million but involved the loss 
of 125 jobs on Benbecula, was taken because the 
economic costs to the local economy were considered to 
be too high, a point made by the Scottish Secretary:  
 
“The potential savings to the Ministry of Defence 
were not worth the cost to the islands' economy. It 
just wasn't a price worth paying for the island”2. 
 
The defence industry in Scotland - 
background 
While it can difficult to establish its importance even in 
terms of a simple measure such as employment, there is 
little doubt that defence is an important sector in Scotland.  
We look at two key indicators of defence in Scotland, the 
first of which is the number of military and associated 
civilian personnel. Outside the military, Scotland also has 
several large-scale defence contractors, including Babcock 
International at Faslane and Rosyth and BAE Systems 
Surface Ships shipbuilders in Glasgow and a number of 
global companies who maintain a presence in Scotland 
because of defence work, including Raytheon, Thales and 
others.  
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Service personnel 
Table 1 details the 2007 level of service employment in 
Scotland. The UK Government’s Defence Analytical 
Services and Advice (DASA) database shows that 12,400 
military service men and women were stationed here, 
around 7.6% of the UK total. To a small extent Scotland 
benefits less than proportionately than the rest of the UK 
from this part of defence, given its current UK population 
share is around 8.4%3.  
 
While small relative to, for example, the estimated 220,882 
jobs in Manufacturing4, the 12,400 military jobs clearly 
constitute a substantial source of employment. As the 
example above shows, however, defence employment may 
be very significant locally. Table 2 below illustrates this by 
detailing employment in six areas, which together account 
for 86% of all service employment in Scotland.  
 
The larger economies of Glasgow and Edinburgh mean 
that in relative terms the contribution service personnel 
make to overall activity is relatively limited. It is clear, 
however, that service employment is significant in areas 
like Fife and Highland, and is particularly important in 
Moray and in Argyll & Bute. We also note that looking at 
employment by Council, the lowest level published, does 
not allow us to identify the extent to which small areas 
within these regions may rely on the military as a source of 
jobs. 
 
Table 3 below gives some indication of the local 
importance of military employment by examining its size 
(relative to both total working population and population in 
employment) in three of the smaller areas. The figures for 
Argyll & Bute and Moray make clear the extent to which 
both rely on defence for a significant volume of their overall 
economic activity. 
 
Non-service personnel 
The military also employ civilians, and DASA (2007) figures 
show around 6,500 civilian jobs at military facilities in 
Scotland (Table 4). DASA therefore estimates that a total 
of 18,900 people were directly employed in the military 
sector in Scotland in 2007. 
 
Recent employment change 
It is also interesting to observe how military employment 
has changed in recent years. According to DASA figures, 
Scotland’s dependence on military employment has been 
falling - armed service employment in Scotland fell by over 
one-third from 19,300 to 12,400 between 1990-2007. 
Civilian employment also fell by over a third between 1997-
2007, from 10,300 in 19975 to 6,500 in 2007.  
 
It is likely that some of the change over this relatively long 
period simply reflects political change – a “Cold-War effect” 
is likely to have had some influence on this long-term 
reduction in numbers, as global political developments 
have meant a reduced need for armed forces since the 
early 1990’s. This is indeed borne out by the fact that the 
number of servicemen in the UK was 56,000 lower in 2007 
than in 1997.  
 
However, it is worth noting here that Scotland has 
experienced a substantially greater proportionate fall in 
employment when compared to the UK as a whole. Table 5 
below shows the change in total employment, military and 
civilian, since 20006, when any effects of the 1990’s 
geopolitical developments have presumably worked 
through. Scotland has clearly seen a disproportionate 
reduction in all UK employment in more recent years. It is 
difficult to conclude anything other than that the 
contribution of military employment has fallen over time, 
and more so in Scotland than in the UK as a whole 
 
Defence contractors 
The other key aspect part of Scotland’s defence 
dependency is contractors who undertake defence work in 
Scotland. Since this paper is attempting to examine 
Scotland’s total dependence on defence we focus 
principally on the number of jobs supported in contractors, 
since this would allow us to estimate total employment in 
both the military and contractor sectors.  
 
i)  DASA estimates 
We begin by looking at official estimates on Scottish 
employment supported by UK military spending. DASA has 
developed estimates of the number of direct full time jobs 
in the UK that are supported by Ministry of Defence (MOD) 
spending and Table 6 details these for Scotland and the 
UK as a whole7.  
 
The table appears to highlight two interesting results. It 
shows firstly that the estimated number of jobs in 
companies in Scotland supported by MOD expenditure fell 
by 30% in the four years to 2006/07. Coupled with the 
reduced level of service employment discussed earlier, this 
would indicate that Scotland’s overall dependence on 
defence had fallen substantially. Secondly, Scotland’s 
share of total UK defence employment also fell sharply, 
from around 8% in 2002/03 to 5% in 2006/07, suggesting 
that Scotland’s defence contractors have lost comparative 
advantage compared to the UK.  
 
However, an examination of the basis of the figures in 
Table 6 casts considerable doubt on the accuracy with 
which they actually measure the number of jobs in 
Scotland supported by MOD spending. For example, DASA 
itself notes that the regional location codes on which the 
estimates are based can fail to distinguish how MOD 
contract expenditure is divided between the direct 
contractor and its sub contractors – if a sub-contractor is 
located in a different region from the main contractor, the 
underlying assumptions on regional expenditure will fail to 
match actual regional expenditure. The codes also fail to 
take account of changes in spending between regions over 
time – given that MOD contracts may last many years, 
movements of production between regions during the 
course of a contract may not be captured. Finally, the
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Table 1:   Service personnel 
 
  Number    
UK Regions  (FTE)* % of Total 
England 140,300  86.5 
Wales 5,000  3.1 
Scotland 12,400  7.6 
Northern Ireland 4,500  2.8 
 
Source: - UK Defence Statistics 2008, Table 2.3 
* Full-time equivalent 
 
 
Table 2:  Service personnel  
 
Selected Scottish  Regions  Number* 
 
Moray     3,100 
Argyll and Bute     2,980 
Edinburgh     1,550 
Fife     1,460 
Highland       620 
Glasgow 560 
Total 10,270 
 
Source:  DASA, TSP 10, Table 5.1 
* Full-time equivalent 
 
 
 
Table 3:  Military personnel as: 
 
 Moray Argyll & Bute Highland 
 
% of working age population 
 
5.9 
 
5.5 
 
0.5 
% of population in employment 6.9 6.8 0.6 
 
 
Source:  DASA, National Online Manpower Information Services (NOMIS) 
 
 
 
Table 4:  Civilian personnel 
 
 
UK Regions Number (FTE)* % of Total 
   
England 65,500 83.0 
Wales 2,400 3.0 
Scotland 6,500 8.2 
Northern Ireland 4,500 5.7 
 
Total 
 
78,900 
 
100.0 
 
Source:  UK Defence Statistics 2008, Table 2.3 
* Full-time equivalent 
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Table 5:  Fall in UK military employment, 2000-2008 
 
 
 % 
United Kingdom 6.2 
England 1.9 
Wales 39.8 
Scotland 17.9 
Northern Ireland 23.7 
 
 
Source:  UK Defence Statistics 2008, Table 2.3 
 
 
 
 
Table 6:  Employment dependent on UK military expenditure 
 
 
 2002-2003 2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006 2006-2007 
      
UK 135.0 135.0 123.0 130.0 135.0 
Scotland 10.0 10.0 9.0 9.0 7.0 
 
Source:  Ministry of Defence 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 7:  Employment in the naval, aerospace and defence industries, Scotland 2006 
 
 
 Number % 
   
Naval 7,291 45.0 
Aeorspace 4,537 28.0 
Defence 4,375 27.0 
 
Total 
 
16,203 
 
100 
 
 
Source:  ADS Scotland, Aerospace, Defence and Naval, Survey 2006 
 
 
 
Table 8:  Employment created by BAE Systems 
 
 Initial 
employment 
Additional 
employment 
Total 
employment 
 
Total 
 
3,404 
 
2,312 
 
5,717 
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 procedure used to estimate employment is based on the 
structure of UK production in 1995.  
 
There is clearly a considerable amount of doubt on the 
accuracy of the DASA estimates. Our best assessment is 
that official UK government estimates actually provide very 
little useful guidance on the size of the economic 
contribution that defence spending makes to the Scottish 
economy. DASA developed the figures in Table 6 
specifically in response to questions from MPs and MSPs 
on the importance of defence to regional economies, but 
they appear to tell us very little about this and the estimates 
clearly need to be revisited. 
 
ii)  ADS Scotland survey 
An alternative source of information on defence contractors 
is the annual Scottish survey undertaken by ADS, an 
industry body representing the Aerospace, Defence and 
Security industries. We look below at the ADS 2006 survey 
findings, approximately the same period as the 2006/07 
DASA figures discussed above.  
 
We would ideally in the present context like to gauge the 
total amount of private sector employment created by 
defence spending in Scottish based contractors, and the 
ADS survey does go some way towards this. However, it 
only covers companies involved in aerospace, defence or 
security. Companies outside these sectors are not 
included, and ADS figures do not include employment in 
other sectors that may sell to the MOD.  
 
Secondly, the total amount of activity that is defence 
dependent is not always apparent. For example, ADS 
stated to the Scottish Affairs Committee that some 
aerospace work is defence-related, but the proportion of 
this is not recorded.  
 
Finally, ADS survey includes figures both for a Defence 
and a Naval sector. However, they have informed us that 
their Naval sector is wholly supported by defence 
spending, and we discuss it below as part of defence-
dependent employment. 
 
The 2006 ADS survey shows that Aerospace, Defence and 
Security employed a total of 16,203 people in Scotland 
(Table 7). Assuming that Naval is wholly supported by 
defence spending, Defence and Naval together account for 
11,666 jobs. This is around two-thirds above the DASA 
estimate of 7,000 jobs, even though the ADS survey does 
not include all MOD spending. A comparison of the 2007 
ADS survey with the results of the previous year also show 
that employment in the Defence and Naval sectors actually 
grew by over 13%. The suggestion that employment in 
contractors increased, albeit based on one year’s data 
contrasts strongly with the DASA findings.   
 
The ADS survey details other important characteristics of 
the industry’s economic importance.  Firstly, the sector 
spent a significant amount on Research & Development in 
Scotland, £74 million in 2006. Reflecting this, ADS argue 
that the sector is important not only on account of the 
number of jobs it provides, but also because of the type of 
jobs – 5,100 employees are graduates, almost one-third 
(31.5%) of the total workforce. This high skill level is 
reflected in industry wages which are around 34% above 
the Scottish average.  
 
It also points to the industry’s position as a supplier of 
apprenticeships. It provided around 600 apprenticeships in 
2007, which it claims was around half of the Scottish total. 
Figures supplied to us by BAE Systems Surface Ships also 
confirm the importance of the industry’s role on this 
measure – the company has the largest apprenticeship 
scheme in Scotland, with over 500 apprentices taken on in 
the last five years. 
 
Spin-off effects 
All of the above employment estimates show only the direct 
jobs supported by military expenditure. They include only 
employment at military bases or in contractors, and do not 
take account of any multiplier effects that result from wage 
spending by employees or by contractor spending at 
suppliers. 
 
There is a very limited amount of information on the further 
impact of defence contracts, and it is of interest here to 
note that the MOD itself apparently has no knowledge of 
the spin-off impact of its own Carrier programme. When 
asked in a parliamentary question to estimate the indirect 
jobs created as a result of the carriers, the Minister for 
Defence procurement replied that the MOD “do not hold 
information relating to the number of indirect jobs”8.  
 
Recent research by the Fraser of Allander Institute does 
provide some measure of the extent to which one major 
contractor, BAE Systems Surface Ships, creates 
employment across the wider Scottish economy9. Table 8 
shows estimates of their total employment impact in 
Scotland. This shows that the company’s 3,404 employees 
in Glasgow support a further 2,312 jobs in Scotland once 
wage spending by employees and spending at local 
suppliers is taken into account. Every one job in Glasgow 
was estimated to support a further 0.68 of a job elsewhere 
in Scotland. The study also estimated that the £102.4 
million worth of wages paid to employees in Glasgow 
supported a total of £156.4 million worth of Scottish wages.  
 
It is clear that the number of direct employees in defence 
must account for only a minimum estimate of the extent to 
which the defence industry supports employment in 
Scotland, but the current position is that we actually know 
little of this aspect of the industry’s wider impact. Further 
information on this type would clearly help to assess the 
overall importance of defence in Scotland. 
 
The outlook for defence 
As mentioned, a key issue surrounding defence is that 
decisions are ultimately political ones. We now examine a 
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number of political developments that could affect the 
industry in Scotland, all of which could directly affect the 
amount of activity and employment it supports.  
 
Public expenditure 
The most immediate current issues surround the UK’s 
current fiscal problems and all three major UK political 
parties have recently signalled the need to restrain public 
expenditure. The MOD’s current budget is estimated at 
£32.6 billion in 2007/08, about 2.5% of UK GDP10 and 
there have been concerns about whether a budget of this 
size can be exempt from cuts.  
 
Both the current UK government and the main opposition 
party have committed themselves to holding a Strategic 
Defence Review (SDR) that will define the UK’s future 
military role for the forthcoming decade, and both parties 
have understandably been reluctant to spell out plans for 
defence in advance of this. However the SDR will not 
report until 2011. We simply do not at present know how 
pressure on the public finances might affect the UK 
government’s future plans for defence. Recent statements 
by the Secretary of State for Defence have thrown some 
doubt on the Government’s overall support for the defence 
budget. The Minister recently warned military leaders that 
they must “live in the real world” and said that the 
government “cannot exclude major shifts in the way we use 
defence spending”. 11 
 
The other main UK parties have signalled that defence 
spending either could (in the case of the Conservatives) or 
will (Liberal Democrats) be reduced. The Conservatives 
have indicated that they will instigate a defence review 
“quickly” should they form the next government, and have 
also said that this will examine a number of major defence 
projects. As the quote below confirms, such a review could 
include two major Scottish defence contracts, the aircraft 
carriers currently being constructed in Glasgow (later to be 
fitted at Rosyth) and the nuclear facilities at HM Naval 
Base Clyde: 
 
“Whether  ... the armed services need ... to 
project power through a proper navy and carriers: 
having the best replacement there is for an 
independent nuclear deterrent - these are 
reasons for all these things. But clearly, when you 
are reviewing spending, you have to review all 
spending”12 
 
The Shadow Chancellor has also implied that the new 
carriers are one of the major defence projects potentially 
subject to review13, and has said in particular that he 
wishes to examine the “break clauses” on the project. 
 
BAE Systems Surface Ships signed contracts to build the 
carriers in July 2008 and construction began in July this 
year. Construction is being undertaken at several yards in 
the UK and work will be ongoing in Glasgow until 2014 and 
2016 respectively. Final assembly of the ships has also 
begun at Rosyth in Fife. The carrier programme 
guarantees shipbuilding on the Clyde until 2016 and will 
also create work in Fife after that.  
 
It would extremely controversial to halt work that has 
already begun. As shown earlier, the company building the 
carriers is estimated to support a total of over 5,000 jobs in 
Scotland. The current position is that UK ministers have 
recently said that they will “continue to support the two 
shipyards”14 and the SNP have also said that they strongly 
support the decision to build the carriers. We are not aware 
of any Liberal Democrat statement on the carriers. A recent 
pamphlet by the party’s Treasury spokesman15 did suggest 
that that major savings could be made in the defence 
budget by cancelling or scaling down weapons systems, 
but suggested that the main targets were Eurofighter, the 
A400M transport aircraft and Trident. 
 
As noted, the carrier programme effectively sustains work 
on the Clyde until 2016. In addition, the MOD has also 
signed a Terms of Business Agreement (ToBA) with BAE 
Systems. The agreement, which intends to protect key 
industrial capabilities in British shipbuilding, gives the 
company a minimum of 15-years exclusivity on design, 
build and support for specified MOD shipbuilding 
programmes.  
 
The MOD has made it clear that the ToBA does not 
“commit the MOD to any particular level of expenditure in 
any geographical location” or specify how BAE Systems 
should plan its work16. However, recent years have seen 
Scotland performing strongly against the UK shipbuilding 
industry. For example, Scotland’s share of the UK 
shipbuilding sector rose from 22% to 33% between 
2002/07 and Scottish Government figures show that its 
overall contribution to Scottish GVA rose from 0.29% to 
0.58% in the same period17. This recent strong 
performance shows that Scotland appears to be gaining 
comparative advantage in shipbuilding and it is a source of 
concern that uncertainty over the carriers may affect 
Scotland’s ability to contribute to future programmes. 
 
Another key defence contract affecting Scotland is Trident. 
The UK parliament voted to take the first steps towards 
renewing Trident in 200718. The decision was supported by 
both main UK parties. The UK government has recently 
said that there is “no intention on this Government’s part of 
moving our position on Trident”19 and the Conservatives 
have said that while maintaining some form of UK nuclear 
deterrent is “non-negotiable”20 it has refused to rule out 
reviewing Trident.  
 
The Liberal Democrats are the only party to have made 
firm commitments on defence, including a recent statement 
that they would not renew the Trident programme. The 
party accepts that public spending must fall and the UK’s 
fiscal position is undoubtedly the key reason behind this 
decision. However, it is also important to note that the 
Liberal Democrats are also the first mainstream UK party to 
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accept the argument that Trident no longer meets the UK’s 
defence needs, in effect saying that it is both unnecessary 
and unaffordable.  
 
Discussions over Trident are not new – its geopolitical 
justification has been subject to scrutiny since the demise 
of the Soviet Union, and Clarke (2004), for example, 
argues that: 
 
“the rationale for a strategic nuclear deterrent is 
increasingly weak....A world dominated by a 
single superpower hegemon...is not a world 
which gives minor players much of a role in 
strategic deterrence. It is scarcely conceivable 
that  that other known nuclear powers such as 
India, Pakistan or North Korea or even near 
nuclear powers such as Iran could become a 
strategic threat to the UK homeland...whatever 
British interests might be threatened.”21 
 
The Liberal Democrat leader recently summarised his 
party’s position as follows: 
  
“a cold war missile system designed to penetrate 
Soviet defences … at any time…from any 
location anywhere round the planet, is not our 
foremost security challenge now. We have got to 
be grown-up and honest about it”.22 
 
The party has begun its own review of how Britain could 
operate a scaled-down deterrent, but have said that it 
would be an “unhappy event” if this concluded with Britain 
retaining a nuclear deterrent. We examine the position on 
Trident further below. 
 
European defence cooperation 
Public expenditure problems have also caused some to 
argue that if UK is unable to afford to sustain all of major 
current defence contracts then greater European 
cooperation in defence as a possible way forward. One 
proponent of this view is Sir Malcolm Rifkind, a former UK 
Secretary of State for Scotland, Defence and Foreign 
Affairs23. He argues that the current defence budget is 
simply “too big to be exempt from cuts”. One or other of the 
major projects is likely to be cancelled, and he suggests 
that “the most likely casualties are the aircraft carriers, the 
joint strike fighters and even Trident submarines”.  
 
The argument that greater cooperation may substitute for 
nationally-based defence policies is obviously likely to 
prove highly controversial and is almost certainly some way 
off. However, greater cooperation across a wide range of 
political functions has been an ongoing feature of the 
European Union since its inception, and will further 
increase with the Lisbon Treaty’s ratification. The 
underlying argument, that it is extremely difficult to 
envisage situations where a threat to the security of any 
one European Union member could not be considered as 
threat to all, means  European cooperation in defence is, 
according to Menzies Campbell,   “not only good military 
sense, it is a political necessity as well”24.  
 
The choice is between unaffordable national domestic 
capability and a greater pooling of defence capability at the 
regional level. If it is indeed the case that existing defence 
budgets proves to be unsustainable across Europe, the 
case for pooling resources does appear to strengthen and 
any move towards greater cooperation would clearly result 
in reduced defence spending. Where Scotland comes into 
this is difficult to say. Sir Malcolm himself gives little 
guidance on this except to argue that each country should 
specialise in the area which is most important to its own 
security – “for the UK, this would be maritime, for Germany 
its land forces”. 
 
Constitutional change 
The other key political issue is the prospect of 
constitutional change. Scottish independence could in 
theory affect any part of the defence sector in Scotland, 
since there would have to be a process of negotiation 
concerning ownership of defence assets following the 
break-up of the UK. In truth, we know little about how either 
military employment or employment in defence contractors 
would actually be affected. The SNP has recently said that 
an independent nationalist administration would be happy 
to allow existing UK military forces to continue to be based 
in Scotland, stating that since Scotland and the rest of the 
UK would remain “friends and allies”, it would be “perfectly 
possible to share basing, procurement and training facilities 
with the rest of the UK”25.  Predictably, this suggestion was 
immediately dismissed by other parties, who argue that 
what remains of the UK would have little interest in either 
retaining military resources or placing work with defence 
contractors. A Scotland Office source argued that: 
 
…The Royal Navy would not give contracts to a 
foreign country…in all, 20,000 defence-related jobs 
would be at risk…no Trident, no Nimrod, no 
Kinloss26. 
 
An outbreak of clarity from the political parties seems to be 
an unlikely prospect at the moment – notably, the Scottish 
Affairs Committee recently divided along party lines over 
whether its recent report should “refrain from speculation 
about any effect the establishment of an independent 
Scottish state might have on the provision of defence jobs 
within Scotland’s territorial boundaries”27. 
 
The constitutional question also raises particular issues 
concerning the nuclear facilities at HMNB Clyde. In 2002, 
Chalmers and Walker began their analysis by noting that 
among the states that possess nuclear weapons, “the 
United Kingdom is now regarded as one of the least 
problematic”, owing to, inter alia, its stable democracy, 
disciplined military forces and cooperative approach to 
international security28.  The thrust of this paper was on 
how Scottish independence might impact on the UK’s 
nuclear capability, particularly because the UK’s only 
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nuclear weapons delivery mechanism is located in 
Scotland - with independence, what remains of the UK 
would then have its sole delivery mechanism located in a 
foreign country. 
 
The scenario outlined by Chalmers and Walker was that 
the advent of an independent Scotland under a nationalist 
administration would almost certainly result in the removal 
of nuclear weapons from Scotland. There is in fact little 
doubt that such a government would indeed insist on their 
removal - the SNP is a longstanding opponent of nuclear 
weapons, and its defence spokesman reiterated its stance 
as recently as last month, saying “No independent nation of 
five million has nuclear weapons, and nor should we”29.   
Like the common European defence policy outlined above, 
Scottish independence has yet to become a political reality. 
However, the possibility of Scotland having to face the 
choice over whether to retain nuclear weapons, as part of 
the wider decision over independence itself, has clearly 
become a more immediate issue with the election of an 
SNP administration in Holyrood in 2007 which proposes to 
hold an independence referendum. The economic effects 
of removing the weapons will be an important feature of 
this debate and it would clearly be useful to have some 
indication of the impact of this.  
 
It is clear that HMNB Clyde is a substantial local economic 
resource. As noted earlier, MOD figures indicate that just 
under 3,000 servicemen and women are stationed in Argyll 
& Bute. In addition, employment figures provided to us by 
Babcock Marine further emphasise the importance of 
Faslane and Coulport to the local area. Babcock Marine, 
who service and maintain Trident at Faslane, employs 
1,320 people at HMNB Clyde and 75% of its employees 
live within 10 miles of the base. Direct employment is thus 
around 4,300 jobs, a figure that does not include any MOD 
civilian personnel employed alongside the military, or any 
measure of the size of spin-off effects. 
 
The study published jointly by the Scottish Campaign for 
Nuclear Disarmament and the Scottish Trades Union 
Congress (SCND/STUC)30 in 2007 is the only recent 
attempt to estimate the impact of removing Trident from 
Scotland.  This study estimated that the removal of Trident 
would result in a loss of 2,191 jobs. However, some of the 
assumptions underlying this figure are clearly untested. For 
example, the estimate depends on there being no net 
reduction in the 500 Royal Marines designated to protect 
Trident, on the assumption that they would simply be 
allocated a new role and remain in Scotland. This seems 
unlikely given that they have the specific role of guarding 
Trident.  
 
The report also estimated that between 1,300 – 1,600 
sailors at HMNB Clyde were dependent on Trident. 
However, its estimate that only a total of 300 service jobs 
would be lost by cancelling Trident is based on its 
assumption that only 300 of these sailors are Scottish – 
sailors recruited from outwith Scotland are excluded. 
Despite the fact that these jobs are in Scotland because of 
Trident, they are not counted as part of the reduction in 
military jobs in Scotland associated with cancelling Trident. 
The report also argues that the savings in public spending 
created by cancelling Trident could be used to create local 
employment in other industries31, a state of affairs that will 
be more difficult to sustain in an era where overall public 
spending requires to be cut. 
 
Conclusions 
Difficult choices on defence will need to be made in the 
future. Defence is an important issue in a number of 
current political debates, but we currently lack clarity on the 
consequences of the choices that will at some point need 
to be made. Official figures are lacking in many important 
respects and may even be misleading. Given also that 
these decisions will ultimately be made by voters, it would 
clearly assist the public if the political parties would spell 
out in more detail both what they believe are realistic 
options and the consequences of these. Neither of these 
situations seems likely to improve in the near future, but 
until we have this information we are making decisions in 
the dark. 
 
 
 
 
 
____________________ 
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Introduction  
In recent years the argument that rebound effects, 
triggered by economy-wide price and income effects, may 
partially or wholly offset reductions in energy consumption 
expected from energy efficiency improvements has gained 
a great deal of attention in both academic and policy 
arenas. In the UK, a report by the House of Lords (2005) 
raised the question as to whether this argument provides 
an explanation as to why total energy consumption in the 
UK hasn’t fallen in line with increased energy efficiency. In 
response, the UK Research Councils have funded 
research, first through the UK Energy Research Centre 
(UKERC) and now at the University of Strathclyde to 
investigate the conditions under which rebound effects may 
occur in the UK economy. The UKERC project involved an 
assessment of the evidence on rebound effects from 
increases in energy efficiency in production and/or in 
consumption, at both the micro level (direct and indirect 
rebound effects at the individual/firm level) and at the 
macro level (economy-wide rebound effects as a result of 
increased energy efficiency in any individual firm/sector 
etc) and is reported in Sorrell (2007). The current 3-year 
research project (ending September 2010) based in the 
Fraser of Allander Institute and Department of Economics 
at the University of Strathclyde, titled ‘An empirical general 
equilibrium analysis of the factors that govern the extent of 
energy rebound effects in the UK economy’, focuses 
specifically on the issue of economy-wide rebound effects 
using empirical computable general equilibrium models of 
the UK and Scottish economies. The purpose of this paper 
is to provide an introduction to the rebound argument, 
drawing on evidence from the Scottish and UK models. It 
will be followed in the next issue of the Fraser of Allander 
Institute Economic Commentary, which will give more 
detailed results from the project.1  
 
The rebound effect 
The rebound argument (now commonly referred to as the 
Khazzoom-Brookes Postulate in recognition of two 
independent contributions by Brookes, 1990, and 
Khazzoom, 1980) is not a new idea. Almost 150 years ago, 
in 1865 an economist named Stanley Jevons (Jevons, 
1865) talked about a “confusion of ideas” regarding the 
productive use of fuel and diminished consumption. His 
argument was that if we increase the utility or benefit we 
get from something there is an impact on its implicit price. 
Thus, if we have an increase in (non price induced2) 
efficiency in use of energy, this lowers the implicit or 
effective price of energy (i.e. we can have more 
consumption/production per physical unit of energy at any 
given price level). Moreover, if we have local supply of 
energy, the decreased energy requirement per unit of 
consumption/production) will put downward pressure on 
actual energy prices also, giving further impetus for 
rebound. 
 
Note that this argument is not specific to energy. The same 
process would apply if, for example, there were an 
improvement in efficiency in the use of labour (and perhaps 
the rebound argument is easier to grasp in that context – 
we don’t expect increased labour productivity to lead to 
mass unemployment; rather we expect economic activity, 
including employment, to benefit from what is basically a 
positive supply-side shock to the economy). 
 
Ranges of the rebound effect 
It is important to note that the presence of rebound effects 
in response to an increase in energy efficiency doesn’t 
necessarily mean the energy consumption will increase. It 
may just mean that we need to work harder to gain 
reductions in energy consumption from increased energy 
efficiency. Table 1 below shows four ranges of the rebound 
effect (see Turner, 2009, or Anson and Turner, 2009, for 
fuller details).  
 
The 0% rebound (R) case would seem unlikely as this 
would seem to imply absolutely no price responsiveness in 
the economy whatsoever. However, as will be discussed in 
more detail in the second article from this project to be 
published in the next issue of the Fraser of Allander 
Institute Economic Commentary, our research has 
suggested that negative rebound effects (i.e. economy-
wide reductions in energy consumption that are 
proportionately larger than the increase in energy efficient) 
may be a possibility where there is local energy supply (as
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Table 1:  Ranges of the rebound effect 
 
 
 
in the case of Scotland). This may occur as a result of 
negative multiplier effects in energy supply sectors as 
demand contracts in response to the initial efficiency 
improvement and/or disinvestment effects (shedding of 
capital stock) in energy supply if revenues fall with 
decreasing prices (see Turner, 2009, and Anson and 
Turner, 2009).   
 
The 0-100% range means that we have positive rebound, 
but a net decrease in energy consumption. Thus, one 
possibility that was raised in the earlier presentation of this 
paper at an EU public hearing on energy efficiency policy3 
is that it may be possible to adjust the size of the energy 
efficiency improvement to achieve a desired reduction in 
energy consumption. For example, with 20% rebound a 
10% efficiency improvement would imply actual energy 
savings of 8%. If a 10% reduction in energy consumption is 
required, the 20% rebound effect would have to be 
compensated for in setting the size of the energy efficiency 
improvement. In this simple example, a 10% reduction in 
energy consumption would require a 12.5% increase in 
energy efficiency with 20% rebound.4 Note that the 
magnitude of the rebound effect will be the same after the 
adjustment: we are simply compensating for it, not 
eliminating it. Moreover, as discussed below, in practice, 
the size of the rebound effect should be determined 
through economy-wide empirical analysis as is likely to 
vary depending on (a) the economy in question, (b) the 
type of activity targeted with an energy efficiency 
improvement, (c) costs associated with introducing the 
energy efficiency improvement and (d) passage of time 
(adjustment of the economy) following the introduction of 
the efficiency improvement. Thus, the actual compensation 
required to entirely offset rebound would be difficult to 
quantify, particularly given issue (d), as the economy may 
take some time to adjust to a new equilibrium (see results 
below for Scotland) 
. 
However, no such compensation can be made in the 
bottom two cases in Table 1 where R is greater than or 
equal to 100%. Here the demand response to falling actual 
and/or implicit energy prices acts to entirely offset any 
energy savings from increased energy efficiency. Where 
we have a net increase in energy consumption (and, of 
course, energy-related pollution), this is an extreme case of 
rebound, referred to as backfire. Here a larger energy 
efficiency improvement will lead to a larger increase in 
energy consumption. Therefore, again, it is important to 
employ an empirical framework to quantify the economy-
wide rebound effect: where backfire is a likely outcome, 
increasing the size of the energy efficiency improvement 
will be a counter-productive strategy. 
  
The next question, then, is what determines the economy-
wide/macro rebound outcome for any given improvement in 
energy efficiency? 
 
 
Economy-wide demand and supply 
responses to increased energy efficiency in 
production sectors 
Turner (2009), with attention on increased energy 
efficiency in production rather than final consumption 
(considered briefly later in this paper), identifies a number 
of economy-wide effects that have now become accepted 
in the wider literature. These are considered below. 
 
The first effect is what we would expect, and what 
motivates the use of energy efficiency to reduce energy 
consumption: 
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1.   The technical/efficiency effect, where we need less 
energy to produce a given unit of output.   
 
However, as explained in the introduction above, this 
triggers a decrease in the effective and possibly the actual 
price of energy, which in turn leads to four different types of 
(direct and derived) demand responses, identified as 
effects 2-5 below:  
 
2.    Substitution effects, where energy is substituted for 
other inputs, as it is now effectively cheaper 
 
3.    Output/competitiveness effects (eg on exports) as 
local production costs (and thus output prices) fall as a 
results of this beneficial supply-side shock (note that this 
effect is the main source of positive GDP and employment 
effects in the sector targeted with the efficiency 
improvement, and in the wider economy); and 
 
4.    Compositional effects, since different goods vary in 
their energy intensities we get a change in structure of 
output in the economy in favour of more energy intensive 
activities5 
5.    Income effects on household direct and indirect use 
of energy (even where households are not directly targeted 
with the efficiency improvement). 
 
However, decreases in actual energy prices and falling 
demand may also trigger negative responses in energy 
supply. First, in response to the efficiency effect (effect 1) 
above, there will be:  
 
6.    Negative multiplier effects in energy supply 
sectors as demand for the output of these sectors falls, 
though these may be negated by the positive demand 
response under effects (2) to (5).  
 
However, if the positive demand response to falling actual 
energy prices is not sufficient to prevent revenues from 
falling in energy supply sectors, it is possible that another 
negative supply effect may occur: 
 
7.    Disinvestment effects, where reduced demand leads 
to decreased actual energy (local and/or imported) prices 
and revenues - falling returns in energy supply activities 
sectors lead to capital disinvestment and contraction in the 
elasticity (responsiveness) of energy supply to changing 
demand. 
 
The potential for disinvestment effects is discussed in 
Turner (2009), where we also argue that the basic 
argument may also be applicable at the global level where, 
despite OPEC’s command of marginal supply, downward 
demand pressures do exert downward pressure on prices. 
A working paper by Wei (2009) considers the issue of 
supply responsiveness more generally. These issues will 
be discussed more fully in the second article on this project 
in the next issue of the Fraser of Allander Institute 
Economic Commentary. 
How important are each of these effects in 
determining rebound?  An empirical 
question 
The magnitude of rebound for any given efficiency 
improvement depends on relative importance of effects 1-7 
(1, 6 and 7 put downward pressure on energy demand, 2-5 
put upward pressure on energy and other demands). This, 
in turn depends on the structure of the particular economy 
where the efficiency improvement occurs, openness to 
trade, demand responsiveness to changes in prices, supply 
constraints, which activities are targeted with the efficiency 
improvement etc, etc. This means that analysis of potential 
macro-level rebound effects for any particular economy 
requires an empirical economy-wide modelling framework 
for that economy. This is commonly referred to as applied 
or computable general equilibrium (CGE) analysis (see 
Sorrell, 2007, and Hanley et al, 2009, and/or Turner, 2009, 
for examples and fuller discussion). 
 
It is important to note that rebound analysis, particularly 
system-wide rebound analysis is a relatively new area of 
research. Both theoretical work and empirical evidence 
limited but are currently gaining a great deal of attention in 
environmental and energy economics fields and the 
literature is growing rapidly along with research activity.  
 
 
Current research at the Department of 
Economics, University of Strathclyde 
As explained in the introduction above, leading on from the 
UKERC work reported in Sorrell (2007), the Fraser of 
Allander Institute economy-energy modelling team have 
been funded by the UK Economic and Social Research 
Council to conduct a project titled ‘An empirical general 
equilibrium analysis of the factors that govern the extent of 
energy rebound effects in the UK economy’. The duration 
of this project is 3 years, from October 2007 to September 
2010 (ESRC Reference: RES-061-25-0010).  While the 
empirical work in this project has largely been focussed on 
the UK (e.g. Turner, 2009) and Scotland (Hanley et al, 
2009, and Anson and Turner, 2009) – though there has 
also been some work on the Spanish case (see Hernandez 
and Turner, 2009) – we have been able to draw more 
general analytical insights to help development of the wider 
rebound research field, in both theoretical and empirical 
terms (e.g. the disinvestment effect identified above is 
established in Turner, 2009).    
 
To date, the project has focussed on efficiency 
improvements in energy use in production. Work is 
forthcoming on energy efficiency increases in household 
energy consumption; however, at this stage we can 
anticipate that, in contrast to increased energy efficiency in 
production activities, there will be no direct positive supply 
shock (increased productivity and GDP), rather simply the 
reduction in demand that triggers price and income effects 
(although the both of these factors may indirectly have a 
positive impact on GDP). 
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Figure 1:    Percentage change in total energy consumption in Scotland and the UK in response to a 5% improvement 
in energy efficiency in all production sectors (applied to locally supplied energy) 
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Table 2:  Long-run impact of varying the target of 5% energy efficient improvement in Scottish production (percentage 
changes from base year) 
 
 
 All sectors 
1-25 
Energy supply sectors 
21-25 
Non-energy supply sectors 
1-20 
 
Total electricity consumption 
Electricity rebound effect (%) 
 
Total non-electricity consumption 
Non-electricity energy rebound effect (%) 
 
1.15 
131.6 
 
0.81 
134.1 
 
2.34 
249.5 
 
1.60 
243.8 
 
-1.21 
41.4 
 
-0.82 
34.8 
 
 
See Appendix 1 for sector identification
 
Our key empirical result for Scotland, illustrated in Figure 1, 
is that we find large backfire effects when local energy 
supply targeted with efficiency improvement (these sectors 
are heavily traded) – see Hanley et al (2009). In contrast, in 
the UK case rebound is more constrained by supply 
response to falling prices, so that while the reduction in 
energy consumption is proportionately less than the 
increase in energy efficiency, there is still a net reduction 
(see Turner, 2009, for more details on the UK results.  
 
Figure 1 shows the results of simulating a very simple 5% 
increase in energy efficiency in all production sectors of the 
Scottish and UK economies respectively using our CGE 
models of the Scottish economy, SCOTENVI, and of the 
UK economy, UKENVI. In the initial stages of our research 
we have simulated very simple energy efficiency shocks as 
this allows us to identify and consider the key drivers of 
rebound effects. In these results we do not attempt to 
consider how the efficiency improvements may be 
achieved. This will be the focus of future research.  
 
What the results in Figure 1 demonstrate is that, because 
of the system-wide response to falling actual and effective 
energy prices, particularly in an economy like Scotland (a 
producer and exporter of energy), reductions in energy 
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consumption due to increased efficiency are likely to be 
partially or even wholly offset by increased demand for 
energy (i.e. rebound effects will occur). Indeed, the Scottish 
results are particularly striking. While the amount of 
electricity consumed in Scotland initially falls (in the early 
stages the output of the Scottish electricity sector increases 
as a result of increased export demand), 15 years after the 
introduction of the efficiency improvement it has risen 
above its initial level. Non-electricity energy consumption 
follows a similar pattern, with the rise above the base year 
value occurring one period later. 
 
There are two key clear implications of the results in Figure 
1.  First, it is important to examine the adjustment process 
of the economy in response to a shock such as increased 
efficiency in the use of energy in production. This is 
illustrated particularly in the Scottish case, where the short 
run impacts of the efficiency improvement are qualitatively 
different to the long run ones. Second, the qualitative 
difference in the Scottish and UK results demonstrate that 
it is important to carry out economy-specific empirical 
analysis.  
 
As noted above, in the Scottish case the backfire effects 
(net increase in energy consumption across the Scottish 
economy) are driven by the fact that energy efficiency 
increases in all Scottish production sectors, including the 
relatively energy-intensive and heavily traded energy 
supply sectors. In Table 2, we show the long-run results of 
focusing the 5% increase in energy efficiency separately in 
energy supply and non-energy supply sectors (Appendix 
1gives a breakdown of the production sectors identified in 
the Scottish model). We define the long-run equilibrium 
where population and capital stocks have fully adjusted to 
the shock (this is not quite achieved in the Scottish case in 
Figure 1, even after the 50 years illustrated, but more than 
85% of the adjustment in energy consumption has taken 
place at this point in time). The third column of Table 2 
shows that backfire does not occur when we do not include 
the Scottish energy supply sectors in the energy efficiency 
improvement.  
 
Hanley et al (2009) present fuller sensitivity results for the 
Scottish case, including the impacts of varying what we 
assume about the degree of price responsiveness in direct 
and derived energy demands.   
 
Factors that may dampen/mitigate rebound 
What can we say now to help policymakers think about 
mitigating the rebound effect? First of all, it is important to 
remember that some degree of rebound in response to 
increases in energy efficiency may not be too problematic 
(certainly not enough to prevent us from attempting to 
increase efficiency, particularly in production, which will 
almost always lead to positive economic benefits in the 
activity where efficiency improves, and in the wider 
economy). It simply means that we are likely to have to 
work harder, factoring in rebound (which will require 
empirical analysis) when setting energy efficiency targets 
to meet desired decreases in energy consumption (and 
rebound will differ across economies, and different 
production and consumption activities within each 
economy, with the implication that common targets for 
energy efficiency may not be possible - energy 
consumption targets may be more appropriate). 
 
Having said this, there are a number of factors that will 
mitigate or otherwise affect the magnitude of rebound 
effects:  
 
x Price induced efficiency in energy use – e.g. 
energy taxes – won’t trigger rebound as above 
and could possibly be used in coordination with 
policies aimed at technological progress (which 
do), of course taking into account likely distortive 
effects (again, CGE analysis can be used for 
scenario analysis). Indeed, in the context of 
energy efficiency from technological progress, 
there may be potential for a ‘double dividend’ 
effect, depending on how revenues are recycled 
(see below).  
 
x The costs of introducing efficiency improvements 
will affect rebound – e.g. in production, if 
increased costs act to entirely offset reductions in 
effective price of energy, may mean zero or even 
negative rebound (see Allan et al, 2007). There is 
also an issue in terms of when costs are incurred 
(rebound effects will be triggered immediately) 
 
x The use of increased government revenues 
generated as a result of increased productivity will 
also affect rebound, eg:  
 
x Recycling as additional government expenditure – 
In Allan et al’s (2007) UK results, this leads to a 
composition effect in favour of less energy-
intensive government demands   
 
x Lowering tax rates – Allan et al’s (2007) UK 
results suggest that this will exacerbate income 
effects driving rebound. 
 
x Alternatively, revenues could be directed towards 
subsidising investment activities etc that would 
facilitate increases in energy efficiency (linking 
back to the issue of costs in the previous bullet 
point). 
 
The key issue here is that it is crucial to develop 
understanding of what drives rebound effects in 
considering where efficiency improvements should be 
targeted and how they should be implemented. We also 
need to understand what will mitigate rebound (but give 
attention to possible negative implications for energy 
supply sectors, e.g. from negative multiplier and 
disinvestment effects). This paper is intended as a first 
stage in this process. The main conclusion is that rebound 
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effects must be factored into the setting of energy 
efficiency targets, and that appropriate economy-wide 
modelling techniques should be employed to estimate 
potential rebound effects on a case-by-case basis. 
 
Conclusions 
This paper has considered the nature of what has come to 
be known as the ‘rebound’ effect in considering energy 
efficiency improvements as a means of reducing energy 
consumption (and associated pollutants, particularly 
greenhouse gas emissions), taking Scotland as an 
empirical example. Our main conclusion is that the rebound 
effect is an empirical phenomenon and should be 
considered on a case-by-case basis for energy efficiency 
improvements (a) in different economies; (b) in different 
sectors/activities of any one economy; (c) in the context of 
different methods that may be adopted to increase energy 
efficiency and their associated costs; (d) the adjustment 
process of the economy. The core conclusion is that any 
reductions in energy consumption are likely to be 
proportionately smaller than the energy efficiency 
improvement and in some circumstances the net effect of 
increased efficiency may be an increase in energy 
consumption. Two main recommendations are that (a) 
energy efficiency improvements should be a policy 
objective, given the economic benefits that will result 
throughout the economy, but that (b) empirical estimates of 
potential rebound effects must be factored into energy 
efficiency targets set in order to reduce energy 
consumption.  
 
Finally, the reader is reminded that the results presented 
here are initial findings of the ongoing ESRC-funded 
project on examining the potential for and main drivers of 
rebound effects in the Scottish and UK economies. Fuller 
project details, outputs and results can be found at the 
project pages on the ESRC Today web-site, which can be 
accessed via the following link: 
http://www.esrcsocietytoday.ac.uk/esrcinfocentre/viewawar
dpage.aspx?awardnumber=RES-061-25-0010 
There will be a non-technical presentation of final project 
results at a stakeholder seminar to be held in the late 
summer of 2010. If you would like to attend this seminar, 
and/or to be placed on our mailing list to receive our project 
newsletter and other updates, please contact the author at 
karen.turner@strath.ac.uk. 
 
____________________ 
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Footnotes 
1More details on this project, along with all project outputs 
to date, can be found on the ESRC Today web-pages at 
http://www.esrcsocietytoday.ac.uk/esrcinfocentre/viewawar
dpage.aspx?awardnumber=RES-061-25-0010. Key project 
results to date can be found in Allan et al (2008), Hanley et 
al (2009), Turner (2009) and Anson and Turner (2009). 
 
2An example of a price induced change in energy efficiency 
may be the use of taxes to raise the price of and reduce 
demand for energy. This will not trigger the rebound effect. 
In this paper we are concerned with increased energy 
efficiency resulting from technological progress. However, 
price instruments such as energy taxes may be an 
appropriate tool to offset rebound effects and/or raise 
revenues that may be used to facilitate energy efficiency 
improvements. 
 
3
 An earlier version of this paper was presented to the 
Public Hearing on Energy Efficiency Policy for End-Users, 
organised by the European Economic and Social 
Committee (EESC) and the Italian Council of Economy and 
Labour (CNEL), held in Rome, July 2009. 
 
4
 Actual energy savings will equal (r-1)p, where p is the 
percentage increase in energy efficiency (e.g. 8%) and 
r=R/100 (i.e. in proportionate terms – e.g. 20% rebound 
means r=0.2). So, with 20% rebound a 10% efficiency 
improvement would imply actual energy savings of 8% (1-
0.2=0.8 times 10). Thus, if instead of a target for energy 
efficiency, we have a target for reduced energy 
consumption - e.g. 10% - the energy efficiency 
improvement required to achieve this will be greater. If we 
want a an X% reduction in energy consumption, the 
required proportionate increase in energy efficiency will 
take the form of 1/(1-r) times X%. If we take X% to equate 
to 10%, this means that, if rebound were 20%, energy 
efficiency would actually need to increase by 12.5% (1/0.8 
times 10). 
 
5
 See footnote 2. This is why energy intensity in Figure 2 
should be considered an imperfect proxy for energy 
efficiency. 
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Appendix 1:  Sectoral breakdown of the 1999 Scottish 
AMOSENVI model  
 
 
1 AGRICULTURE 1 
2 FORESTRY PLANTING AND LOGGING 2.1, 2.2 
3 FISHING 3.1 
4 FISH FARMING  3.2 
5 Other mining and quarrying 6,7 
6 Oil and gas extraction 5 
7 Mfr food, drink and tobacco 8 to 20 
8 Mfr textiles and clothing 21 to 30 
9 Mfr chemicals etc 36 to 45 
10 Mfr metal and non-metal goods 46 to 61 
11 Mfr transport and other machinery, electrical and inst eng 62 to 80 
12 Other manufacturing 31 to 34, 81 to 84 
13 Water 87 
14 Construction 88 
15 Distribution 89 to 92 
16 Transport 93 to 97 
17 Communications, finance and business 98 to 107, 109 to 114 
18 R&D 108 
19 Education 116 
20 Public and other services 115, 117 to 123 
  ENERGY   
21 COAL (EXTRACTION) 4 
22 OIL (REFINING & DISTR OIL AND NUCLEAR) 35 
23 GAS 86 
  ELECTRICITY 85 
24 Renewable (hydro and wind)   
25 Non-renewable (coal, nuclear and gas)   
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Devolved immigration 
policy: 
will it work in 
Scotland? 
 
 
 
Professor Robert Wright and Irene Mosca, Department of 
Economics 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
In February 2005, the then Home Secretary Charles Clarke 
outlined a “five year plan” aimed at changing fundamentally 
the way immigration to the United Kingdom is managed. 
Central to this plan is the adoption of a “points-based 
system” (PBS), where applicants are allotted points or 
“scored” for possessing human capital characteristics that 
make them more employable, such as education, technical 
skills, and work experience. If some threshold level of 
points is achieved (which can be varied), then the 
individual is entered into a pool of individuals who will 
eventually be allowed to immigrate to the UK (usually 
conditional on satisfactory security and medical checks). 
With such a system the policy shifts away from matching 
“jobs to people” to matching “people to jobs”. Such a shift is 
desirable since immigration can be used to strategically fill 
job vacancies and help plug skills gaps caused by 
population ageing and labour force decline. Although the 
UK Government has tended to portray this system as new 
and novel, it is not—it it is a minor variant of the system 
introduced in Canada in 1967 and copied by Australia in 
1973. What does this new system mean for Scotland, a 
country with a government committed to maintaining 
historical high levels of net-migration? 
 
2. UK Points-based immigration system 
The UK PBS will eventually replace the system that 
includes over 80 ways to immigrate to the UK. The old 
system is clearly idiosyncratic, if not ad hoc, and is both 
inefficient and expensive to administer. The new system 
consists of five “Tiers”, with each tier focussing on a 
different type or class of immigrants. The basic structure   
is summarised in Table 1. The “Tier 1 General immigrant” 
category is aimed at allowing high-skill individuals to come 
to the United Kingdom to look for work or self-employment. 
Such an individual does not need an employment offer. 
Likewise, an individual intending to be self-employed does 
not need to present a detailed business plan. Such 
individuals when they apply to immigrate are given points 
for educational qualifications, previous earnings, United 
Kingdom experience and age. It is worth noting that “Tier 3” 
of the UK PBS is currently suspended. This Tier is aimed at 
the management of lower- and low-skill immigration. 
However, no date has been given for when this part of 
system will be re-introduced.  In fact there is very little 
discussion of this and the focus is on rolling out the 
remaining tiers to plan. Although few politicians will admit it, 
their expectation is that immigrants from those mainly 
central and eastern countries that joined the European 
Union in 2004 (the so-called “A8 countries”) will continue to 
be the main source of low-skill immigration, with Poland 
being the biggest single source. 
 
At the moment, an individual wishing to immigrate to the 
UK must score at least 75 points to “jump” the first hurdle. 
In addition, the individual needs to fulfill an “English 
language requirement”.  In order to “jump” this second 
hurdle, a relatively high standard of written and spoken 
English is required i.e. a “Band 6” score on the 
International English Language Testing System (IELTS) or 
a degree from an English-language institution of higher 
education. A Band 6 IELTS score is similar to what most 
higher education institutions in Scotland require from 
students whose first language is not English. It is hard to 
judge whether 75 points is a high or low threshold. The 
system has not been up and running for very long and to 
date little data has been made available to (non-
government) researchers. However, our analysis of both 
the Canadian and Australian systems suggests that this 
threshold is indeed high, especially when it is coupled with 
a far from trivial English language requirement. 
 
Will the introduction of this points system lead to lower 
levels of immigration to the UK? The answer to this 
question is a clear “maybe”. It all depends on whether the 
75 points hurdle is increased or decreased in the future. If it 
is increased, then immigration will decrease. If it is 
decreased, then immigration will increase. In this sense, 
the hurdle is like a price with the government acting like a 
monopoly setting price to generate a certain quantity. 
Therefore people who have concluded that the introduction 
of a PBS in the UK will lower immigration levels are wrong. 
To illustrate this point, we can consider what happened in 
Canada. In September 2003, the Canadian government 
lowered the minimum points needed from 75 to 67, in order 
to meet higher immigration targets. Given the nature of the 
system, most commentators concluded that this change 
was a sizeable reduction, with the result (somewhat 
unsurprisingly) being that immigration levels were higher in 
subsequent years. 
 
Our view is that the minimum number of points in order to 
be eligible to immigrate to the UK will be increased in the 
future. This will make the UK an even more difficult country 
to immigrate to for people outside the EU. In the last 
national election, all three major political parties committed 
themselves to reducing immigration levels “if elected”. It 
seems likely that in next spring’s national election, 
immigration policy will be even more central. It is not 
difficult to understand why the main political parties are 
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Table 1:  Summary of structure of the UK points-based immigration system (PBS) 
 
 
Tier Statement of intent Applications open 
Tier 1:  General 
Tier 1:  General (India) 
Tier 1:  General (Worldwide) 
Tier 1:  Investors 
Tier 1:  Entrepreneurs 
Tier 1:  Post-study 
 
7 December 2007 
7 December 2007 
7 December 2007 
7 December 2007 
7 December 2007 
 
30 June 2008 
30 June 2008 
30 June 2008 
30 June 2008 
30 June 2008 
 
Tier 2:  Skilled workers with a job offer 
 
March 2008 27 November 2008 
Tier 3:  Limited numbers of  low skilled workers needed to fill temporary 
labour shortages  
 
This tier is currently 
suspended 
 
Tier 4:  Students 
 
Due March 2008 March 2009 
Tier 5:  Youth mobility and temporary workers Due March 2008 27 November 2008 
 
 
Source:  Home Office Border and Immigration Agency 
 
 
 
Table 2:  Maximum points – Canada and Quebec immigration systems 
 
Characteristic Canada Quebec 
Education 25 11 
Employment experience 21 10 
Arranged employment 10 15 
Age 10 10 
Language 24 24 
English 16 (8) 6 
French 8 (16) 18 
Adaptability 10 10 
Total 100 80 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 3:  Inter-provincial migration rates – foreign-born versus native-born Canadians 
 
 5-year rate 
Census Native-born Foreign-born p-value 
2001 3.5% 2.8% <0.01 
1991 4/1% 4.1% <0.01 
1981 5.3% 5.3% <0.01 
 1-year rate 
Census Native-born Foreign-born p-value 
2001 1.0% 0.8% <0.01 
1991 1.3% 1.0% <0.01 
    
 
 
Note:       It is not possible to calculate the 1-year rate for 1981 since the necessary quetion was not asked on this census. 
Source:  Authors’ calculations 
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Table 4:  Inter-provincial migration rates – immigrant cohort and matched samples – 2001 Canadian census 
 
Rate Census Cohort Immigrant cohort 
sample 
Matched 
sample 
p-value 
      
5-year rate 2001 1996 6.2% 4.1% <0.01 
1-year rate* 2001 2000 2.4% 1.4% 0.05 
 
  
Notes: 1996 (2000) cohort includes immigrants who first obtained landed immigrant status between January 1, 1996 (2000) and May 15, 
 1996 (2000) 
 Number of immigrants = 1,989 (5-year); 2,365 (1-year) 
 Number of matches = 350,387 (5-year); 530,940 (1-year) 
 Number of draws = 500 
 (*) does not include Atlantic Canada or the Territories 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations 
 
concerned with immigration. Immigration to the UK has 
increased sharply over the past decade and is now at a 
historically high level. Furthermore, the bulk of immigrants 
still settle in London and the South-east of England. This is 
also the part of the country where anti-immigration 
sentiment is growing. It also happens to be the area of the 
country where General Elections tend to be won or lost 
given about 25 per cent of the UK population is 
concentrated there. 
 
What does all this mean for Scotland?  The question then 
becomes how does one increase immigration to Scotland 
(as the Scottish Government appears to want) and at the 
same time reduce immigration to the United Kingdom (as 
UK Government appears to want)? At first these policy 
objectives may appear to be totally incompatible. 
Immigration policy is set for the UK “as a whole” by the UK 
Government and any policy that reduces immigration to the 
UK “as a whole” will also reduce immigration to Scotland. 
This will certainly be true unless immigrants to the UK are 
required to reside and work in a particular region for a 
minimum period of time. However, there is nothing in the 
points-based system that takes into consideration the 
different demographic conditions that exist across the UK.   
 
 
3. Adding regionality to immigration policy 
Regional differences are a key feature of Canadian 
immigration policy. These differences are reflected in the 
immigration system. All the ten provinces of Canada (and 
one of its three territories) have agreements with the 
federal (Ottawa) government relating to immigration which 
takes into consideration specific provincial (territorial) 
requirements. Beginning in the late 1990s, “Provincial 
Nominee Programmes” (PNPs) have been established. 
PNPs are negotiated agreements that essentially mean 
that responsibility for immigration is shared between the 
provincial and federal governments. Similar agreements 
exist between the territorial and federal governments in 
Australia, although regionality is less central in Australian 
immigration policy. 
In practise these programmes mean that applicants with 
certain skills face a lower immigration threshold if they 
agree to live, work and stay in a particular province/territory 
for a minimum period of time.  This minimum period of time 
is often 1,095 days of residence, which is also what is 
needed to be eligible for Canadian citizenship. Once 
citizenship is obtained (or the minimum period expires), the 
individual can reside anywhere in Canada. One of the main 
reasons PNPs were introduced was to counter the 
historical tendency of immigrants to concentrate in the 
three main cities of Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver. 
They are based on the empirical regularity that once an 
immigrant arrives in one province, after two years of 
residence, the probability of moving to another province 
drops off considerably. In other words, if you get people to 
a particular region in the first place, there is a high 
probability that they will stay permanently. 
The Canada-Quebec Accord (CQA) goes one step further 
and essentially devolves responsibility for immigration to 
the province of Quebec. In this arrangement, potential 
immigrants apply directly to the Province of Quebec and 
not the Dominion of Canada. The CQA is also a points-
based system. However, the weighting is different, as is 
shown in Table 2. Essentially the CQA system awards 
fewer points for education/qualifications/employability and 
more points for knowledge of the French language. 
Quebec “picks” the immigrants and the federal government 
issues the visas and work permits, and administers the 
medical and criminal background checks. 
 
The UK PBS could easily and quickly be modified along 
these lines to meet Scotland’s needs by allotting more 
points to applicants who agree to live, work and stay in 
Scotland. Immigrants who choose this option could be 
issued with a visa that states that they are only allowed to 
work in Scotland. The period of this permit should be the 
same amount of time needed to applying for citizenship, 
which can be varied.  This simple modification will only 
work if the government is serious about enforcing the terms 
of the residence requirement. Those who fail to do so
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Figure 1:  Five-year inter-provincial migration rate - 2001 Canadian Census 
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Figure 2:  One-year inter-provincial migration rate (%) - 2001 Canadian Census 
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would have their work permit revoked and would no longer 
have the right to work. Since a “deal is a deal”, the 
government must be prepared, as a last resort, to deport 
those who fail to live up to the agreement. Given the UK 
Government has promised to be “tougher” on refugees and 
asylum seekers in terms of enforcing deportation orders 
(and numbers are falling), this does not seem to be a 
massive leap forward in “policy”. 
 
 
4. Do provincial nominee programmes work? 
It is often argued that one reason for not devolving 
responsibly for immigration to Scotland is that Provincial 
Nominee Programmes “don’t work” in the sense that 
people do not stay in the province or territory they agreed 
to immigrate to. At face value, this seems unlikely since the 
sanctions are considerable for breaking the immigration 
contract. However, if it was true, then we would expect to 
see high rates of interprovincial migration in the years 
immediately after arrival. This of course is a legitimate 
question that could be answered empirically. However, in 
our search through the literature, we found no studies that 
specifically addressed this issue. We did however find a 
number of studies that demonstrate that the inter-provincial 
migration behaviour of native-born and foreign-born 
Canadians is surprisingly similar (e.g. Edmonston, 2002; 
Finnie, 2000; Lin, 1998; Newfold, 1996; Nogle, 1994; 
Robinson and Tomes, 1982). 
 
In order to address this issue more directly we have 
analysed micro-data collected in the 1981, 1991 and 2001 
Canadian censuses. Questions were asked about where 
respondents lived one and five years earlier so it is 
possible to calculate inter-provincial migration rates for 
native-born and foreign-born individuals.  In 2001, there 
were few Provincial Nominee Programmes up and running 
although the separate system for Quebec had been in 
place for a decade. In this sense we   are effectively 
considering what can be termed the “before period” when 
PNPs were not a central feature of Canadian immigration 
policy. In our future work, we will compare this to the “after 
period” with data from the 2006 Census (once it becomes 
available). 
 
These calculations are summarised in Table 3. Three 
points are worth noting. In all comparisons, the rate of 
inter-provincial migration is higher for native-born 
Canadians and this difference is highly statistically 
significant. The second is that the rate for both of them has 
declined over time. The third is that 2001 5-year rates of 
2.8% and 3.5% and 1-year rates of 0.8% and 1.0% do not 
seem especially large. In addition, as is shown in Figures 1 
and 2, the inter-provincial migration rate is much higher for 
native-born Canadians in the younger age groups.  
 
It is also possible with census data to calculate inter-
provincial migration rates for specific cohorts of immigrants 
since the year of immigration is also collected. With the 
2001 census, we have calculated the 5-year migration rate 
for the cohort who immigrated in 1996 and the 1-year rate 
for the cohort who immigrated in 2000. These rates provide 
a more detailed picture in the period immediately after 
arrival. However, there is no natural comparison group 
since there is no cohort of “non-immigrants”. On their own 
such rates do not have much meaning. In attempt to 
provide a comparator, matching methods are used (see 
Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd, 1997, 1998a, 1998b). 
Space does not allow for a detailed discussion of these 
methods but the basic idea is simple. You select a set of 
characteristics that are thought to be correlated with 
migrating. Our list included: age, sex, marital status, 
education, presence of children and province/territory of 
residence. For every immigrant in the same sample you 
select a native-born individual with the same 
characteristics. You then calculate the difference in the 
migration rates between the two groups. The approach is 
quasi-experimental in the sense that the immigrants make 
up the “treatment group” while the matched sample of 
hypothetical individuals make up the “control group”.  
The results based on the 2001 census are shown in Table 
4. For the 1996 immigrant cohort, the percentage that had 
moved province five years later was 6.2%. This rate is 
higher than the rate for the matched sample rate of 4.1%. 
This difference is statistically significant at the 1 per cent 
level.  For the 2000 immigrant cohort, the percentage who 
had moved province one year later was 2.4%. This rate is 
again higher that the rate for the matched sample rate of 
1.4%. However this difference is only statistically significant 
at the 5 per cent level. Taken at face value, these rates do 
not seem “high” remembering that there will be few PNP 
immigrants in these cohorts. 
 
5. Concluding comments 
As it stands at the moment, there is absolutely nothing in 
the UK points-based system that will make it easier for the 
Scottish Government to deliver on its promise of reversing 
Scotland’s population decline. There is nothing in it that will 
attract people to Scotland. The Government’s electoral 
promise to reduce immigration to the UK will also reduce 
immigration to Scotland.  It is somewhat surprising that the 
UK Government praises the Canadian and Australian 
immigration systems yet at the same times ignores the fact 
that regionality is a cornerstone of both. Scottish specificity 
could easily be built in through bonus points or lower 
thresholds for those who agree to live, work and stay in 
Scotland for a minimum period of time. Or the responsibility 
for immigration could be transferred to the Scottish 
Government along the lines of the Canada-Quebec Accord. 
In fact, points-based systems with regionality operate 
better than country-wide systems. Systems of the later type 
simply attract immigrants to areas with high immigrant 
concentrations, since chain migration is a feature of 
unrestricted or unmanaged migration flows. In this sense, 
modifying the UK PBS is not a situation of applying 
principles that are in any sense “new and unproven”—it is 
only a matter of political will.   
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